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Introduction
Consider a shipper who hires a trucker to ship goods from A to B. The shipper may provide
the truck, or the trucker may come with his own. The quality of the trucker' s effort and output
is subject to influence. The trucker may choose how to maintain the truck (how to drive), how
cautious he is with the goods he ships, how fast he ships the goods, and so on. In a full
information economy, the question of who should own the truck is a question of technology.
Differences in ability to exploit the values of the truck decide efficient allocation. For
instance, if the shipper can exploit economies of scale in truck preservation and repairs (if he
owns several trucks), or economies of scope in networking, logistic, customer relations
etcetera, he should own the truck. Any concerns about the trucker's effort and output can be
perfectly solved by contracts.
Full information is, however, not realistic. Effort is often hard to observe. Output may often
be observable, but still difficult to verify by the court, since the assessment of an output's
quality may be complicated and also rather subjective. So even if it is possible for the parties
to contract on key output variables, they cannot solely rely on court enforcement.
So assume that it is difficult, or costly, for the parties to contract on maintenance. An efficient
way for the shipper to induce the trucker to carefully maintain the truck could then be to let
the trucker own it. As owner, the trucker becomes residual income claimant, which implies
that he gets the money when he sells the truck. That way truck ownership gives the trucker an
incentive to yield effort in truck maintenance. But by owning the truck, he can decide non-
contractual usages, for instance to offer truck services to other shippers. Even if total surplus
(shipper's + trucker's surplus) is maximized if the trucker concentrates on doing an optimal
job for the shipper, he may instead be tempted to engage in rent seeking while he works for
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the shipper (e.g. spending time on searching for alternative customers), in order to maximize
his own surplus at the expense of the shipper. Hence, there are costs and benefits with letting
the trucker own the truck. Since it is impossible, or at least very expensive, to write legally
enforceable contracts, the trucker and the shipper must to a certain extent trust each other in
order to reduce the costs and exploit the benefits of the relationship. If they transact with each
other only once, it may be difficult to establish trust, but if they transact with each other
repeatedly, trust abuse can be costly, since it may ruin a profitable long-term economic
relationship. l
The objective of this dissertation is to decide optimal incentives and efficient allocation of
ownership rights in transactions that cannot be fully protected by legal contracts. In the
shipper-trucker example the questions are: Generally, what are the feasible incentive schemes
that the shipper can offer the trucker? And specifically, who should own the truck?
Even if a transaction cannot be fully protected by legal contracts, it does not mean that the
transaction cannot take place. The question is how to efficiently implement and protect these
kinds of transactions. I consider two solutions: efficient design of 'relational contracts' and
efficient allocation of ownership rights.
Relational contracts: Transacting parties can write contracts even if the contract cannot be
enforced by the legal system. The main attribute with contracts that are not legally
enforceable is that it includes elements that cannot be verified by parties that are not involved
in the transaction, e.g. the court. In the economics literature, a contract that cannot be legally
enforced is most often referred to as a 'relational contract', but the term 'implicit contract' is
also used. In this dissertation I will for the most part use 'relational contract' .
A relational contract is a response to the necessity of incomplete contracts. For a contract to
be complete, each transacting party must be able to foresee, and accurately describe, all
relevant contingencies that might happen during the course of the contract. Moreover, they
must determine and agree upon an efficient course of action for each possible contingency.
This is at best very costly, but in most cases unrealistic. Then, instead of trying to approach
complete contracting, transacting parties often choose the relational contracting approach that
l The shipper/trucker example is inspired by Baker and Hubbard (2003).
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focuses on the goals and objectives of the transaction without trying to specify all
contingencies. In this dissertation, it is the problem of contracting on the quality of the agents'
output that makes complete contracting impossible, and relational contracting necessary.
Since a relational contract cannot be legally enforced, it must be self-enforcing. That is, the
parties that engage in the contract must have economic incentives to honour it. The more
frequently the parties transact, in other words, the longer the term of the economic
relationship, the higher are the incentives to honour the contract, since contract deviation can
ruin future trade. A self-enforcing relational contract is thus modelled in a repeated game
framework where the contracting parties write a contract on future transactions, and where the
present value of honouring the contract versus the present value of reneging decides the
contract's self-enforcing conditions. In such, the repeated game approach is a formalization of
a rational trust-concept: an agent honours trust if it is profitable.
Ownership rights: There are two important qualities with the institution of ownership that
makes the allocation of ownership rights crucial for efficient implementation of non-verifiable
contracts: first, ownership, accompanied by secure property rights, gives residual control
rights that, to a certain extent, can substitute for complete contracts. Residual control right
over an asset is the right to make any decisions concerning the asset's use that are not
explicitly controlled by law or assigned to another contract. Since the owner of an asset has
this right to decide any non-contractual usages, the institution of ownership can substitute for
legal contracts when disputes take place. Second, ownership rights act as an incentive-device
when complete contracts are impossible. The owner of an asset does not only possess the
residual control rights, but he is also the residual income claimant of that asset. The residual
return from an asset is the amount that is left over after all contractual obligations have been
paid. Residual income together with residual rights gives the owner of an asset incentive to
manage the asset optimally.
In this dissertation I mainly consider transactions that are subject to asymmetric information.
Asymmetric information implies that that there are relevant variables that are known to some,
but not all the agents involved in the transaction. This implies either that transacting agents
cannot observe each other' s actions - inducing problems of moral hazard, or ability -
inducing problems of adverse selection. In this dissertation, the informational focus is on non-
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observable effort decisions and thus the problem of moral hazard. With moral hazard follows
the need for incentives. The relational contract must therefore be able to implement proper
incentive schemes. The strength and structure of these incentives are decisive for the
relational contract' s self-enforcing conditions. The challenge is to combine efficient design of
self-enforcing relational incentive contracts with efficient allocation of ownership rights in a
way that maximizes the surplus of the transaction.
Literature
The first formal analysis of the ownership rights solution to incomplete contracts was made
by Grossman and Hart (1986), and further developed by Hart and Moore (1990). Grossman,
Hart and Moore (GHM) demonstrate how residual ownership rights can substitute for legal
contracts and act as an incentive-device. In a formal analysis, GHM show how transacting
parties can, prior to the transaction, allocate ownership rights in a way that maximizes the
surplus of the transaction, in particular in a way that reduces the level of relationship specific
under- or over-investment. Since GHM interpret ownership rights to physical assets as the
defining characteristic of the firm, their theory was in fact a first formal analysis of firm
boundaries that did not take the production function as a starting point.
GHM' s important contribution, known as the property rights approach, was in many ways a
formalization of the seminal work of Coase (1937), Williamson (1975,1979,1985) and Klein,
Crawford and Alchian (1978). Coase asked the simple question: "why do we have firms?"
and answered that firms will only exist in environments where firms perform better than
markets. He argued that some transactions are so costly that they cannot be efficiently
implemented in markets. Coase especially discussed the cost of discovering relevant prices,
and the costs of "negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange
transaction ... "and argued that firms (or ownership integration, to use the language of
Grossman, Hart and Moore) greatly reduces the number of necessary contracts. Williamson
developed the 'transaction cost theory' by identifying more thoroughly the conditions that
create transaction costs. Instead of focusing on the direct costs of contracting, as Coase did, he
discussed strategic transaction costs such as the problem of imperfect contracting in terms of
opportunism and relationship specific under (or over) investments. The latter was particularly
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discussed by Klein et. al., who demonstrated how specific investments by A in B creates
specialized quasi rents that can be appropriated by B after the investment is sunk, and how
this cause A to under invest in B. They argued that this kind of transaction costs could be
reduced by ownership integration.
A critique against transaction cost theory was that even if it demonstrated the costs of
contracting in the market (between firms) it did not elucidate the benefits of organizing the
transactions within the firm. This was the key objective to GHM; to formally compare the
costs and benefits of ownership. They showed that ownership integration does not necessarily
reduce the problem of relationship specific investments. The benefit of integration is that it
increases the acquiring firm's incentive to make relationship specific investments since it will
receive a greater portion of the ex post surplus from the transaction. But the cost of
integration is that the acquired firm's incentive to make specific investments decreases since
it will receive a smaller fraction of the surplus.
In order to insulate the effect of ownership, the property rights approach considered a static
environment absented from contracts. An important point from Williamson (inspired by
Simon, 1951; Macaulay, 1963 and MacNeil, 1974) was in fact that firms could use relational
contracts in order to deal with the excessive costs of complete contracting. Williamson did
not, however, define relational contract in a way that could be used in more formal analysis.
The first repeated game analysis of relational contracts, where the present value of honouring
the contract versus the present value of reneging decides the terms of the contract, was made
by Klein and Leffler (1981). They analysed reputation effects in assuring product quality.
The buyer pays a price premium to the supplier to assure that the supplier exert effort in
producing good quality. If the supplier reneges on the contract, all his potential customers get
to know this, and the supplier therefore loses all future sales. Further progress to the relational
contracting modelling was made by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Bull (1987), Klein (1990)
and especially MacLeod and Malcomson (1989). Common for these models is, however, that
the parties have symmetric information; hence the moral hazard/hidden information problem,
which is considered to be the classic impediment to effective contracting (e.g. Holmstrom,
1979), does not appear in these models. Relational contract models with asymmetric
information was developed by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994, 2002) and especially Levin
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(2003) who makes a general treatment of the self-enforcing relational contract model with
asymmetric information and risk neutral agents.
The first paper to comprehensively combine the formalization of relational contracts, with the
property rights approach, is Baker, Gibbons and Murphy's "Relational Contracts and the
Theory of the Firm" (2002). Their main result is that asset ownership affects transacting
parties temptations to renege on relational contracts. They deduce several implications from
this result, where the most important are: i) high-powered incentives create bigger reneging
temptations under integration than under non-integration. ii) it is impossible to mimic the
spot-market inside the firm, because the reneging temptation then becomes too big. iii)
vertical integration is an efficient response to widely varying supply prices because varying
supply prices create bigger reneging temptations when the parties are non-integrated.
The present dissertation draws both on the property rights approach and the relational
contracting literature, and thus especially on Baker, Gibbons and Murphy's important
contribution. Methodologically, I apply non-cooperative garne theory, and especially theories
of repeated garnes, using Nash's (1950) equilibrium concept, refined by Selten (1965). In
addition I use calculus to solve constrained optimisation problems.
The essays
The dissertation consists of four essays, or 'papers', that each deals with transactions that
cannot be fully protected by the legal system. But even if the papers are founded on the same
assumption of non-verifiable contracts, they each emphasize different topics within what
broadly can be termed organizational economics, and can thus be read independently from
each other.
Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration
This paper seeks to modify the conventional hypothesis in the literature that increased asset
specificity leads to more vertical integration. Klein et. al. (1978) note that asset specificity
creates appropriable specialized quasi rents and claim that "integration by common or joint
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ownership is more likely the higher the appropriable specialized quasi rents of the assets
involved." Williamson (1985) argues that the high-powered incentives of markets may
impede the efficient coordination required to implement relationship specific investments,
since the involved parties want to appropriate as much as possible of the coordination gains.
Vertical integration is a way of reducing these kinds of co-ordination problems. Grossman,
Hart and Moore (1986,1990) show that if complementary or co-specialized assets operate
under separate ownership, the parties owning the assets will under invest in the relationship.
I note that if the level of asset specificity increases, the relative value of external trade is
reduced. In a modified version of Baker, Gibbons and Murphy's (BGM) model (2002), I
show that in a relational contract between two independent parties of a relationship specific
input, increased specificity reduces the temptation to renege on the relational contract, since
the benefit of external trade is reduced. This creates scope for higher-powered incentives. If
the buyer owns the seller (vertical integration), however, the buyer has the residual control
right to the good produced, so the seller cannot hinder the buyer to force internal trade.
Hence, in this case asset specificity does not affect the self-enforcing conditions of the
contract. Non-integration can therefore be an efficient response to asset specificity.
The result finds empirical support, for instance in the offshore industry where the oil
companies and their main suppliers, who design and build installations that the oil companies
use to extract oil, always operate with separate ownership even though the suppliers manage
capital stock and produce inputs that are highly specific to the buying oil companies.
The modification to BGM is mainly in terms of player strategies. In their set up, the parties
play grim trigger strategies in which deviation from the relational contract results in spot
governance forever after. In spot governance, the parties cannot contract ex ante on ex post
realizations, but they can negotiate ex post over the price of the good. I analyse so-called
carrot and stick strategies where contract deviation results in a one-period trade in the
alternative market before return to the relational contract. These kinds of strategies, also
called 'mutual punishment', are more complex to analyse, but in settings with high levels of
asset specificity, they are still more realistic than the standard grim strategies.
8 INTRODUCTION
Human Capital and Risk Aversion in Relational Incentive Contracts
This paper examines a relational incentive contract between a risk neutral principal (or
employer) and a risk averse agent (or worker/employee) where the agent's human capital is
essential in ex post realization of values. I analyse the effect of outside options on the optimal
degree of performance pay, showing how the presence of ex post outside options may impede
desirable degrees of performance pay. In particular, I show that if the value of the agent's
outside alternatives are high, it may be impossible to implement contracts with low-powered
incentives, since the agent, if he has done a good job, has an incentive to renege on the
contract and plea for a renegotiation. Hence, even though the agent prefers a wage contract
with a higher fixed salary, the existence of good outside options creates a lower bound on the
bonus level that lies above the desirable level. This reduces the feasible fixed salary that the
employer can afford to pay. I show how the parties can eliminate this problem by choosing a
level of asset specificity that enables the parties to implement the desirable degree of
performance pay.
The paper is, to my knowledge, the first to analyse relational contracts that includes both
asymmetric information, in the form of unobservable effort, and risk aversion. It is difficult to
make definite treatments of risk aversion in repeated game models of relational incentive
contracts, but I allow for an approximation, studying repeated linear incentive contracts with
bounded support on the noise-variable. This makes it possible to study the effect of risk
aversion, variance and incentive responsiveness within relational contracts with asymmetric
information. I show that the first order effect of these parameters are the same as in verifiable
contracts, but second order effects show that the optimal bonus level' s sensitivity to risk
aversion and incentive responsiveness increases with the discount factor.
The paper emphasizes the role of human capital. The challenge of contracting on human
capital lies in the subtle balance between the residual control right of the worker and the
authority of the employer. In order to capture this balance, I analytically separate two types of
rights that often is considered to be interlinked: the right to decide the management of the
asset, and the right to decide the usage of the values created by that asset: the principal has the
authority to decide on the agent's behaviour, that is, the agent is only allowed to exert effort
along one dimension; hence he cannot take alternative actions that exclusively improve his
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bargaining position. But the agent has residual control rights of ex post values since he has the
opportunity to sell his value added in the alternative market. The analysis shows that this right
is crucial to statements on optimal firm boundaries. BGM (2001, 2002» provide an answer
the famous 'Williamson puzzle' by showing that incentives from the spot market cannot
always be replicated in a relational contract inside the firm, due to problems of contract
enforcement. The model in this paper shows that this argument depends on the assumption
that the agent has no control rights ex post value realizations. If the agent is risk averse, and
his human capital is essential for ex post realization of values, the firm can always replicate
the market, but the market cannot always replicate the firm.
Team Incentives in Relational Contracts
This paper compares three types of incentive schemes for teams: an incentive scheme based
on joint performance evaluation (JPE) compensates members of team based on the team's
overall performs. Hence, a worker is rewarded if his peers perform well. An incentive scheme
based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) rewards team members that perform
relatively better than their peers. Hence, a worker is rewarded if his peers perform badly. An
incentive scheme based on independent performance evaluation (lPE) rewards the team
members independently from their peers' performances.
The classic advantage with RPE is that the employer can make a workers' compensation
independent from good or bad outside factors (common noise components), while the
advantage with JPE is that it encourages cooperation. Che and Yoo (2001) formalize the latter
by considering an implicit contract between two agents on yielding high effort. I combine the
framework of Che and Y00 on team incentives with the framework of BGM (2002) on
relational contracts to find under which conditions relational incentive contracts based on
JPE, RPE and IPE are self-enforcing. Like Che and Y00, I study a repeated game between
one principal and two agents, but contrary to them I assume that the quality of the agents'
output is non-verifiable, so that legal enforcement is impossible. Hence, I model a self-
enforcing relational contract between the principal and his agents.
I deduce two results that can explain why individual compensation based on IPE and/or RPE
is especially common among 'white collar' workers in the higher levels of organizations: first,
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I find that we can expect a relatively higher frequency of incentive schemes based on RPE
and IPE when the productivity of effort is high. The higher the productivity, the easier it is for
the principal to offer credible incentive schemes, hence the critical discount factors necessary
to implement relational contracts, decrease. But, on low discount factors, lPE is more
expensive since it is harder for the agents to enforce an implicit contract between them on low
discount factors. Hence, higher productivity makes the enforceability of IPE and RPE rise
relatively to lPE. Second, I find that IPE is more probable if the agents own the critical assets.
By each owning a critical asset, the agents can ex post bargain over the surplus independently
from each other. This opportunity is especially threatening to the relational contract when
incentives are based on non-independent performance evaluation since the agents risk getting
low wages from the relational contract, and high wages from independent bargaining. This
problem is eliminated with IPE.
Norms Matter
The objective of the last paper is to demonstrate that norms, in terms of trust-level, trust
structure and type of trust, is decisive for firm boundaries. Hart (2001) argues that it is hard to
find clear-cut relationships between trust and optimal allocation of asset ownership. In the
typical repeated game approach, where the discount factor is a proxy for trust, a move from a
'low-trust' environment to a 'high-trust' environment only reveals that cooperation in general
is more likely to occur both between integrated parties and non-integrated parties.
I develop two simple models to show that norms actually can determine firm boundaries.
First, I consider a repeated trust game (with symmetric information) between a buyer and a
seller of inputs. I do not make the standard assumption that contract verifiability is
exogenously given; instead I introduce endogenous probability of contract verification. The
more the parties invest in contract specifications, the higher is the probability of a third party
(the court) verifying and thus legally enforcing the contract. If the discount factor is
sufficiently low, transactions will only be implemented if the possibility for contract
verification is sufficiently high. By introducing this endogenous probability of legal contract
enforcement, we get hold of a trade-off between 'direct transactions costs', discussed by
Coase, and 'strategic transaction costs', introduced by Williamson et. al: the lower the degree
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of relationship-specific under investment, the higher is the necessary investment in contract
specification.
This substitutability between direct and strategic transaction costs makes it possible to study
optimal asset allocation focusing on institutional differences in possibilities of legal contract
enforcement. Following, Rock and Wachter (2001), I argue that the incentives to invest in a
detailed contract are weaker when parties are under the same ownership than when parties are
under separate ownership. In integrated firms, the marginal effect of contract specifications on
the probability of legal enforcement is reduced by the probability that the owner instead of the
court will solve contractual disputes. In repeated relationships with contracts relying both on
legal enforcement and self-enforcement, this implies that non-integration dominates in low
trust environments: if the discount factor is sufficiently low, the contract cost necessary to
implement a contract is higher when the parties are integrated, than when the parties are non-
integrated.
The second model is a static version of the same game, but now with non-verifiable actions,
non-rational, reciprocal agents and asymmetric information. I show that if the trust game is
played only once, the party with the best reputation of being trustworthy should own the asset.
As residual claimant, the asset owner has the power to either honour or abuse trust, when
contracts cannot be verified. If the asset owner is considered trustworthy, it relaxes the
trusting party' s participation constraint, and increases the surplus from the transaction. Hence,
if reciprocity is the norm, then the parties' reputation of obeying this norm is decisive for
optimal asset allocation, since the asset owner' s reputation decides the surplus from the
transaction.
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I

Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration
Ola Kvaløy
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Abstract: Asset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration.
The main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behaviour, and that vertical integration
reduces this problem of opportunism. In this article I show that asset specificity actually can
be an argument for non-integration. In a repeated game model of relational contracts, based
on Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002, I show that asset specificity affects the temptation to
renege on relational contracts between non-integrated parties, but not between integrated
parties. If the parties are non-integrated, higher levels of specificity can provide relational
contracts with higher-powered incentives .
• I thank Iver Bragelien, Frøystein Gjesdal, Kjell Hausken, Frode Meland, Petter Osmundsen, Gaute Torsvik and
especially Trond E. Olsen for valuable comments and suggestions.
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1. Introduction
The transaction cost theory entered the stage in the mid 1970s, partlyas an attempt to explain
the fundamental Coaseian question: Why do we have firms? The question acted as a headline
for the general problem of economic organization: How do we explain the various observed
ways of organizing economic activity? The factors leading to vertical integration have been a
central issue in this literature. And a factor that has received a lot of attention is the degree of
asset specificity. The traditional hypothesis is that asset specificity leads to vertical
integration. This hypothesis is formulated through different lines of thought. Klein, Crawford
and Alchian (1978) emphasize the problem of "hold-up". A party that has invested in specific
assets may be forced to accept a worsening of the terms of the relationship after the
investment is sunk. Hence, asset specificity creates appropriable specialized quasi rents. Klein
et al. claim that "integration by common or joint ownership is more likely the higher the
appropriable specialized quasi rents of the assets involved." Williamson (1985, 1991)
emphasizes the problem of maladaptation. As investments in specific assets increase,
disturbances requiring coordinated responses become more numerous and consequential. The
high-powered incentives of markets may impede efficient coordination, since both parties
want to appropriate as much as possible of the coordination gains. Vertical integration is a
way of reducing this kind of maladaptation. The "property rights approach", developed by
Grossman, Hart and Moore (GHM) (1986, 1990), does not formulate an explicit hypothesis
concerning asset specificity, but states that if assets are strictly complementary, then some
form of integration is optimal. GHM show that if complementary or co-specialized assets
operate under separate ownership, the parties owning the assets will underinvest in the
relationship.
The three approaches introduced here share the common belief that there is a correlation
between the degree of asset, or investment, specificity and the appearance of vertical
integration. In the April 2000 edition of Journal of Law and Economics, Klein states that
H ••• the rigidity costs associated with long term contracts increase as relationship-specific
investments increase (...}. Therefore, the greater the relationship-specific investments present
in an exchange, the more likely vertical integration (that avoids the rigidity costs associated
with long term contracts) will be chosen as the self-enforcing arrangement. All that is
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required for this positive relationship between specific investments and the likelihood of
vertical integration is that the relative inefficiency costs from weakening of incentives is not
systematically positively related to the level of specific investments, and there is no reason to
believe they are. "
In the present article I will show, however, that there may be a reason to believe that the
"relative inefficiency costs from weakening of incentives" are systematically positively
related to the level of asset and investment specificity. The analysis draws on a repeated game
model of relational contracts developed by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (BGM), 2002. A
relational contract' contains rules or standards that cannot be legally enforced. Hence, the
contract must be self-enforceable in the sense that the present value of honouring the contract
must be greater than the present value of reneging. BGM show how asset allocation matters in
the presence of long-term relational contracts. An important result is that incentives in
relational contracts between firms can be higher-powered than incentives in relational
contracts within firms. In a modified version of BGM's model, I show that this difference in
incentive intensity is positively related to the degree of asset and investment specificity.
The repeated game model is one in which an upstream party in each period uses an asset to
produce a good that could either be used in a specific downstream party's production process,
or put to an alternative use. Asset ownership conveys ownership of the good produced, so if
the upstream party owns the asset (non-integration)," the downstream party cannot use the
good without buying it from the upstream party, whereas if the downstream party owns the
asset (integration), then he already owns the good. Since the good's value to the downstream
party exceeds its value in the alternative market, the parties agree on a relational contract
where the downstream party pays bonuses to make the upstream party improve the specific
quality of the good. In order to analyse asset specificity within this framework, it is necessary
to make modifications to BGM's model. In their set up, the parties play grim trigger strategies
in which deviation from the relational contract results in spot governance forever after. In spot
governance, the parties cannot contract ex ante on ex post realizations, but they can negotiate
ex post over the price of the good. BGM assume Nash bargaining, so the price depends on
, Relational contracts are also called 'implicit' contracts (e.g. MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989).
2 Following Grossman and Hart's (1986) terminology, seller ownership is called "non-integration"; buyer
ownership is called "integration",
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bargaining positions, but not necessarily on the level of asset specificity (since high and low
levels of specificity can yield the same spot price). Asset specificity clearly matters, however,
if the parties face the possibility of actual trade in the alternative market. I analyse so-called
carrot and stick strategies where contract deviation results in a one-period trade in the
alternative market before return to the relational contract. These kinds of strategies, also
called mutual punishment (Myerson, 1997), are more complex to analyse, but are still more
realistic than the standard grim strategies.
When the alternative market is a real alternative and the parties can choose between a
relational employment contract (integration) and a relational outsourcing contract (non-
integration), high levels of asset specificity induce relational outsourcing.' The reason is that
increased specificity reduces the temptation to renege on a relational outsourcing contract,
since tre benefit of external trade is reduced. In a relational employment contract, however,
the downstream owner has the residual control right to the good produced, so the upstream
party cannot hinder the downstream party to force internal trade. Hence, asset specificity does
not affect the self-enforcing conditions of the employment contract. This difference between
employment contracts and outsourcing contracts makes the relative efficiency of non-
integration increase with the level of asset specificity. The reduced temptation to renege on
the relational outsourcing contract, due to increased specificity, makes it possible to design
higher-powered incentive schemes without running the risk of opportunistic behaviour.
This link between asset specificity, contract efficiency and asset allocation seems not to be
addressed in the theoretical part of the literature. Repeated game models of economic
organization acknowledge that relational contracts may be a substitute for vertical integration
in dealing with the problem of opportunism. They also recognize the role of reneging
temptation in the design of efficient incentive contracts. But the absence of a formal
comparison of relational contracts between firms and relational contracts within firms, prior
to Baker, Gibbons and Murphy's important contribution, has made the separating effect of
specificity hardto identify. Klein and Leffler analyse reputation effects in assuring product
quality in their seminal 1981 paper. The buyer pays a price premium to the supplier to ensure
that the supplier exerts effort to produce good quality. If the supplier reneges on the contract,
3 The terms 'relational employment' and 'relational outsourcing' stem from BGM
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all his potential customers get to know, and the supplier therefore loses all future sales.
Hence, the alternative market disciplines against opportunistic behaviour. But Klein and
Leffler do not compare relational contracts between independent parties with contracts
between vertically integrated parties. Halonen (2002) recognizes the importance of reducing
outside options in order to reduce the gain from contract deviation, in her dynamic version of
the HartlMoore (1990) game. But she does not relate the outside options to the difference
between specific and alternative use. Since the supplier in her model only makes specific
investments in human capital, she relates the outside option to the investing party's
dependency on the asset he invests in, i.e., to what extent it is important that the investing
party manages the asset. Hence, Halonen does not make any statements concerning asset
specificity and vertical integration, but she recognizes that separation of strictly
complementary assets can be beneficial in providing maximum punishment for deviation.
The idea that putting parties in more adverse situations may promote efficiency is also
discussed in Klein (1980) and Williamson (1983). Klein refers to the case where franchisers
require franchisees to rent from them, rather than own the land on which their outlet is
located. This prevents opportunism since the franchiser can require the franchisee to move if
the franchisee cheats. Williamson ises the concept of hostages to emphasize the importance
of credible commitment. By posting hostages, that is posting a value before the transaction in
order to commit to the other party, one can reduce the
possibility of opportunistic behaviour and negotiate a contract with better terms. Chiu (1998)
relates the importance of credible commitment directly to the concept of investment
specificity. He claims that "the theoretical prediction that integration is more likely in the
presence of relationship-specific investments is not as robust as previously thought". He
shows that specific investments cause a threat to the relationship when outside options are
attractive, not when outside options are unattractive, as the traditional hypothesis implies. But
Chiu does not compare the effect specificity may have on contracts between integrated parties
with the effect on contracts between non-integrated parties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the empirical
research on the determinants of vertical integration. Section 3 presents the model. A
comparative analysis is made in Section 4, while section 5 concludes.
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2. The empiricism ofvertical integration
There is an impressive body of empirical research that supports predictions of transaction cost
economics (see Joskow 1988, and Shelanski and Klein 1995 for an overview). I believe,
however, that the empirical work does not verify the hypothesis that asset specificity leads to
vertical integration. It is a fact that a number of quantitative case studies and cross-sectional
econometric analyses show a positive correlation between asset specificity and vertical
integration. But these studies do not prove that asset specificity leads to vertical integration.
The econometric models assume that organizational form is a function of asset 1pecificity,
uncertainty, complexity and frequency. Organizational form is the dependent variable while
asset specificity is one of the independent variables. The causality between the variables is in
general not discussed.
Even though many transaction cost economists claim that the vertical integration hypothesis
has a substantial empirical foundation, a number of prominent economists question the
empirical validity of the hypothesis. Ronald Coase has all since his famous contribution "The
Nature of the FIrm" (1937) doubted the importance of asset specificity in bringing about
vertical integration. He is in fact sceptical to the concept of opportunism in analyses of
economic organization. He argues (1988) that the importance of reputation makes it unlikely
that a party would act opportunistically even if assets are specific. His experience is that
businessmen fmd contractual arrangements to be a satisfactory answer to the possible
problems of asset specificity. Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) point out "many of the hybrid
organizations that are emerging are characterized by high degrees of uncertainty, frequency,
and asset specificity, yet they do not lead to integration. In fact, high degrees of frequency and
mutual dependency seem to support, rather than linder, ongoing cooperation across firm
boundaries. "
The economic organization of the international oil industry may serve as good example of
separated specific assets. The oil companies and their main suppliers, who design and build
installations that tre oil companies use to extract oil, always operate with separate ownership.
But the suppliers manage capital stock and produce inputs that are highly specific to the
buying oil companies. The inputs may be valuable to a competing oil company, but the
technology is often tailor-made for a specific field or a specific company. The parties usually
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agree on a so-called EPCI-contract, in which the mam suppliers are responsible for
engineering, procurement, construction and installation. The parties normally agree on an
even split of cost overruns and savings relative to a target sum. Hence, the contracts contain
high-powered incentive schemes (for more details see Osmundsen, 1999). It is reasonable to
assume that these incentive schemes would not have been feasible in an integrated solution.
The specificity of the assets and the dependency between the parties makes it possible for the
oil companies to design strong incentives without the risk of hold-up behaviour.
The classical empirical case of vertical integration has been the General Motors' (GM)
acquisition of Fisher Body in 1926. The standard view has been that GM merged vertically
with Fisher Body because of concerns over specific investments and hold-up behaviour.
Several economists now question this exp lanation. Coase (2000) points out that GM already
owned 60 percent of the shares of Fisher Body before they acquired the remaining 40 percent.
He claims that there is no evidence that hold-up occurred before the merger took place.
Freeland (2000) states tbat "far from reducing opportunistic behaviour, the vertical integration
in fact increased GMs vulnerability to rent seeking behaviour based in human asset
specificity". Casadesus and Spulber (2000) argue that the merger reflected economic
considerations specific to that time, not some immutable market failure. The contractual
arrangements and working relationship prior to the merger, they claim, exhibited trust rather
than opportunism.
3. The model
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy analyse an economic environmen consisting of an upstream
party (U), a downstream party (D) and an asset, where both parties and the asset live forever
or cease to exist simultaneously at a random date. The parties are risk neutral and share the
discount factor, 8 , per period. The upstream party uses the asset to produce a good that could
either be used in the downstream party's production process, or put to an alternative use. In
each period the upstream party chooses a vector of n actions (or investments)
a = (apa2, ••• ,an) at a cost e(a} which affects the value of the product both for the
downstream party (Q) and for the alternative market (P). The downstream value is either high
or low, where q(a} is the probability that a high value QH will be realized and 1- q(a) is the
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probability that a low value QLwill be realized. The alternative-use value can also be either
high or low, where p(a) is the probability that a high value, PH ' will be realized and
1- pea) is the probability that a low value PL will be realized. Given the upstream party's
actions, the downstream and the alternative-use values are conditionally independent. It is
assumed that c(O) = q(O) = p(O) =0, so when the upstream party decides not to take actions, he
bears no costs but also has no chance of realizing the high values. It is further assumed that
PL<PH <QL <QH so that the value to the downstream party always exceeds its value in
the alternative use. In other words, the asset is relationship specific. The first-best actions, a' ,
maximizes the expected value of the good in its efficient use minus the cost of action, hence
the total surplus from the transaction is given by
S*=~ax [QL + q(a' )L\Q-c(a*) J, where L\Q = QH -QL·
The actions are unobservable to anyone but the upstream party, so contracts contingent on
actions cannot be enforced. It is assumed that Q and P are observable, but not verifiable, so it
is possible to design self-enforceable contracts, but not to contract on Q or P in a way that a
third party can enforce.
The parties can organize their transactions through different choices of contract governance
and ownership structure. With respect to ownership structure, it is assumed that asset
ownership conveys ownership of the good produced, so if the upstream party owns the asset
(non- integration), the downstream party cannot use the good without buying it from the
upstream party, whereas ifthe downstream party owns the asset (integration), then he already
owns the good. With respect to contract governance, the parties can agree on either a spot
contract or a relational contract. In a spot contract, a spot price is negotiated for each period
and is determined by ownership structure and bargaining positions. If the upstream party
owns the asset, 50:50 Nash bargaining over the surplus from trade decides the spot price. If
the downstream party owns the asset, he can just take the realized output without paying, so
the upstream party will refuse to take costly actions. In a relational contract, the parties agree
on a compensation contract (s, bL' bH' f3L' f3H) where salary S is paid by downstream to
upstream at the beginning of each period, and bi is supposed to be paid when Qi is realized,
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(i = H, L) and f3j when Pj is realized, (j = H, [1. For example: If the upstream party
produces a good which yields a high value in the specific relation, QH' and a low value in the
alternative market, PL' the downstream party should, according to the contract, pay the
bonuses bH + fJL to the upstream party." Such a contract induces the upstream party to yield
effort even ifhe doesn't own the asset. Since the contract cannot be enforced by a third party,
the parties will honour the contract only if the present value of honouring is greater than the
present value of reneging.
BGM's taxonomy of organizational design is summarized as follows (see BGM, QJE pp.46 ):
Non-integration Integration
Spot contract Spot outsourcing (SO) Spot employment (SE)
Relational contract Relational outsourcing (RO) Relational employment (RE)
So far, I have been following BGM's set-up. In this paper I will compare relational
outsourcing with relational employment using other player strategies than the grim trigger
strategies analysed by BGM. In BGM, if a party reneges on a contract, the other party refuses
to enter into a new relational contract with that party. Instead, they agree to trade in spot
governance forever after. In this paper, however, if one of the parties reneges, they first agree
on a spot price (as in BGM). In the next period, the party who did not renege punishes the
other party by refusing to enter into any agreement (including a spot agreement) and instead
chooses to trade in the alternative market. After this "punishment phase" the parties return to
a relational contract (see strategy specifications below). These kinds of trigger strategies are
in the literature referred to as mutual punishment strategies, carrot and stick strategies, or two-
phase punishment strategies (see Gibbons, 1992).
BGM's strategy specifications have the advantage of both being simple to analyse and
making it possible to compare all four organizational forms within the same framework. In
the modification studied here, it is simply assumed that specificity deters spot contracting
from being a long-term option. Still, there are several reasons for making this modification.
4 BOM start up with a more general contract (s ,bHH, bHL,bLH ,bLL) , (i,j=H,L), but restrict it
to(bHH = bH + f3H' bHL = bH + f3L,bLH = bL + f3H,bLL = bL + f3L) in order to simplify the comparative
analysis.
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First, it can be argued that the carrot and stick strategy is more realistic than the grim strategy,
especially in buyer/supplier relationships with high levels of asset or investment specificity. It
is difficult to understand why the parties would stick to spot governance forever after a
contract breach when specificity makes relational contracting significantly more efficient than
spot contracting. Carrot and stick strategies are more in line with actual economic behaviour
off the cooperation path. In the offshore industry, for example, contract breach often results in
operators i) renegotiating the terms of the current project, (ii) searching for new long term
trading partners, while trading directly in inferior spot markets iii) entering into a new long
term contracts with either the old trading partner or a newone (see e.g the Norsok reports,
1995). Second, analysing carrot and stick strategy equilibria is more appropriate if asset
specificity is regarded as a significant explanatory variable. In order to analyse the effect of
asset specificity in long term contracts, the alternative market must be modelled as a real
threat point, not merely a reference point for spot negotiations. In BGM the level of asset
specificity does not affect the robustness of relational contracts. In the. present paper,
however, asset specificity does affect the parties' temptation to renege on relational contracts.
Third, both grim strategies and carrot and stick strategies yield the same surplus, for given
actions, in equilibrium. But for sufficiently high levels of specificity, efficient relational
contracts can be implemented for lower discount factors when the parties play the carrot and
stick strategy than when they play the grim strategy. This provides an argument for studying
carrot and stick strategies in the presence of specificity.
In this paper, the strategy for V (D) is specified as follows:
1. In period t, honour the terms of the relational contract (s,bL,bH,f3L,f3H) if D (V)
honoured in period t-I,
2. In period t, honour the terms of the relational contract (s, b., bH' f3L' f3H ) if there was no
trade with D (U) in period t-1.
3. In period t, refuse to trade with D (V) if the trade between the parties in period t-I was
accomplished by spot contracting.
To "honour the terms of the relational contract" means for the upstream party to accept the
bonuses offered and for the downstream party to pay the promised bonuses. We enter this
game ex post quality realizations in period t.When the parties are to decide whether to honour
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or renege on the contract, they know the quality realizations of period t, but can only have
expectations regarding the remaining periods. The parties honour the contract if the present
value of honouring exceeds the present value of reneging. A relational contract is self-
enforcing if both parties choose to honour the contract (s,bL,bH,f3L'f3H) for all possible
realizations of Qj and Pj• The critical part of the analysis is to deduce the conditions for
when the relational employment contract and the relational outsourcing contract are self..
enforcing. Technically, these are conditions for when the strategies specified above constitute
subgame perfect Nash equilibria ofrelational contracts. See appendix on subgame perfection.
Before we proceed, consider four additional assumptions: First, it is assumed that both parties
incur a switching cost v by trading in the alternative market when the product has already
been produced for the purpose of trading in the specific relation. 5 They avoid this cost if they
know ex ante that no trade will occur between the parties. Second, in contrast to BGM, it is
assumed that ownership is fixed on the "punishment path". This seems realistic as long as the
strategies, in case of deviation, specify only one period of spot governance. Only small
negotiation rusts would make a one-period ownership transfer inefficient (Halonen (2002)
fixes ownership forever after deviation even in grim trigger strategies). Third, BGM assume
that C(O) yields QL always. But it is more realistic and thus assumed il this paper, that if the
upstream party takes no costly actions, he can choose between realizing QL and realizing zero
values. This gives the upstream party a punishment possibility even if the downstream party
owns the asset. 6 Fourth, it is assumed that the downstream party' s valuation of the alternative
market goods is equal to the price he has to pay. Hence, if the downstream party buys the
good in the alternative market, he earns no surplus from this trade." None of these
assumptions changes the quality of the results in this paper, but they are made both for
analytical convenience and in order to make the upstream-downstream relationship as realistic
as possible.
5 We can view these costs as time costs or extra transport costs associated with the unexpected move from
relational trade to alternative market trade.
6 This assumption will not change the downstream payoff function in relational contracts since Q; will always be
realized in relational contracts equlibria. Also note that this does not mean that upstream can hold-up the good in
relational employment ex post realization. The choice ofrealizing QL or zero is taken ex ante.
7 BGM say nothing about this since the parties never trade in the alternative market in their model.
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3.1 Relational employment
If the upstream party is confident that the downstream party will honour the contract
(s,bL,bH,{3L,f3H) then the upstream party will choose actions aRE that solve:
Max (s +b, +dbq{a)+ f3L + df3 p{a)-c{a))== URE where db =b; -bL' df3 = f3H - f3L, and
a
superscript (RE) denote relational employment. The expected downstream payoff is
thenE{Qi -bi - f3j - sla = aRE) = QL +dQq{aRE )-s - bL - Mq{aRE)_ f3L - df3p{aRE) ==DRE
so total surplus under relational employment is SRE ==URE +DRE = QL + q{aRE)dQ_c{aRE).
Given that the downstream party always honours the contract, the upstream party will earn
s+bi + f3j -c (aRE) ill period t, and expect a total
oft;r(s+bL +dbq{aRE)+ f3L +df3p{aRE)-c{aRE))= trURE from future trade ifhe honours
the contract To make the different payoffs easy to compare, I distinguish between period t,
period t+ 1 and all the remaining periods. The present value of honouring the relational
employment contract is thus written
If the upstream party reneges on the contract in period t by refusing to accept the promised
payment bi + f3 j (or refusing to make a promised payment if bi + f3j < O), the trade is
accomplished by spot contracting, where the downstream party, as the asset owner, just takes
the good and leave the upstream party with nothing. According to the specified strategies,
there is no trade between the parties in period t+1, so the upstream party earns nothing and
bears no investment costs. In period t+ 2 the relational contract is re-established. The payoff
after reneging is then
The upstream party will thus honour rather than renege on the relational employment contract
when, for all values of i and j,
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Given that the upstream party always honours the contract, the downstream party's payoff
from honouring the relational employment contract is
If the downstream party reneges on the contract in period t, he will just take the realized
value, Qi' and pay nothing. In period t+1 the upstream party will refuse to produce the good,
so the downstream party has to buy the good in the alternative market. He will not gain a
surplus on this trade, since his valuation of this non-specific good is equal to the price he has
to pay. In period t+2 the relational employment contract is re-established. The present value
of reneging on the contract is thus simply
The downstream party will honour rather than renege on the relational employment contract
when, for all values of i and},
(1) and (2) represent 8 constraints that have to hold in order for the relational employment
contract to be self-enforcing. Combining these restrictions yields (see appendix):
This is both a necessary and a sufficient corstraint for the relational contract
( s, bL' bH , f3 L' f3H ) to hold, since the parties can always choose a fixed salary S that satisfies
both (l) and (2). The efficient relational employment contract maximizes total surplus, S RE,
subject to (3).
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3.2 Relational outsourcing
In relational outsourcing, if the upstream party is confident that the downstream party will
honour the contract (S, b., hH, f3L' f3H) the upstream party chooses actions a RO that
solveMax (s+hL +flbq(a)+f3L +flf3p(a)-c(a))==URO where superscript RO denotes
a
relational outsourcing. The downstream party's payoff is then E(Qi - s -hi - f3ila = aRO) =
QL + flQq (aRO) - S - bL - flhq( a RO) - f3L - flf3p (a RO) == DRO, so total surplus under relational
outsourcing is SRO ==U RO + DRO = QL + q(a RO )flQ - c(a RO) •
If the upstream party honours the relational outsourcing contract he will receive
If the upstream party reneges on the contract in period t, trade is accomplished by spot
contracting. Since the upstream party now owns the asset, the downstream party cannot just
take the good. I assume, like BGM, that the parties set prices by means of 50:50 Nash
negotiations, which yields t (Qi + P; - v) .8 In period t+ 1, downstream refuses to trade with
upstream. Anticipating this, upstream chooses actions a AO which solve,
Max(PL +Mp(a)-c(a ))== UAO• In period t+2 the parties re-establish their relational
a
contract."
The upstream party's payoff after reneging is then
8 The downstream party will pay the upstream party the alternative value ~ - v plus half the surplus from trade
with the downstream party: -t(Q; - (Pj - v)) , i.e. -t(Q; +~ -v) .
9 The strategy in which the no-trade-punishment is deferred until period t+ l coincides with subgame perfect
equilibrium for v exceeding a criticallevel (see Appendix). According to the specified strategies, the parties
know that trade in the alternative market follows after spot governance. Hence, they avoid the switching cost v if
they defer the trade in the alternative market from tuntil t+1.
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The upstream party will thus honour the contract when, for all values ofi and},
If the downstream party honours the contract he will earn
Ifthe downstream party reneges in period t, the parties agree on the 50:50 Nash price so that
the downstream party earns Qi - S - t(Qi +~ - v). In period t+1 upstream refuses to trade
with downstream, who has to buy the good in the alternative market and thus gams no
surplus. The downstream party's payoff after reneging is then
The downstream party will thus honour the contract, for all values of i and}, when
Combining (4) and (5) yields the following condition for the relational outsourcing contract to
be self-enforcing (see appendix):
Like (3), (6) is both necessary and sufficient. The efficient relational outsourcing contract
maximizes total surplus SRO subject to (6).
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4. Comparative analysis
We can now compare relational outsourcing with relational employment. First, observe that
(3) and (6) underscore BGM's main proposition: The parties' temptation to renege on a given
relational contract depends on asset ownership. 10 I will now show how asset and investment
specificity affect the parties reneging temptations under different types of ownership. Defme
QL - PL as the level of asset specificity, and ~Q - M as the level of investment specificity.
Now, observe that in relational outsourcing the value of the upstream party's outside option,
UAO == PL +Mp(aAO)_c(aAO), is part of the relational contract constraint. In relational
employment, however, the outside option is equal to zero for any level of PH and PL. Hence,
the levels of both asset specificity and investment specificity affect the relational outsourcing
constraint, but not the relational employment constraint. In relational outsourcing the
downstream party's temptation to renege is lower than in relational employment, since he
cannot just take the good, but has to bargain a spot price with the upstream owner. On the
other hand, the upstream party's temptation to renege is higher under relational outsourcing
than under relatio nal employment, because of his outside options. Under relational
outsourcing, increased specificity will thus reduce the relative value of the upstream party's
outside option, and thereby give scope for better relational contracts.
From (3) and (6) we observe that increasing incentive intensity, given by ~b,~/J, increases
the total temptation to renege on a contract. Low bonuses may induce the upstream party to
renege, while high bonuses may induce the downstream party to renege. Moreover, we
observe that if U AO is sufficiently low, then there is scope for higher-powered incentives in
relational outsourcing than in relational employment. Hence, if the level of asset specificity is
sufficiently high, which implies that SRO _URO is high, and high-powered incentives are
desirable, then relational employment is inefficient compared to relational outsourcing. We
gain intuition by thinking through an incentive for downstream to increase the specificity of
an asset. If tre upstream party possesses an asset that is highly valuable to a broad market,
downstream may wish to acquire the upstream party's asset in order to avoid strategic
behaviour. The problem then is that the downstream party's incentive to cheat on upstream
10 Olsen (1996) has a related result, showing in a two-period model that the choice ofrenegotiating a contract
depends on organizational form
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rncreases, so upstream may call for lower-powered incentive schemes and higher fixed
salaries. But if higher-powered incentives are desirable, he can make tailor-made investments
in the asset in a manner that increases its internal, but not its external value. Then he can
safely outsource the asset to upstream, achieving higher-powered incentives without running
the risk of upstream opportunism.
I will now derive a formal result showing that relational outsourcing can be an efficient
response to high levels of specificity. Assume that the two gradients of partial derivates
~ (aFB)'a:, (aFB), i = 1,2,... ,n are linearly independent (superscript FB denotes first-best).
Then a first-best solution can only be achieved if Sb =!1Q and !1/3 = O.
Given (3), first-best can be achieved under a relational employment contract if
Given (6), first-best can be achieved under a relational outsourcing contract if
8> H!1Q+!1P) 8RO.
- QL +!1Qq(aFB)-c(aFB)-PL -!1Pp(aAO)+c(aAO)
Hence, to be able to implement first-best at equal or lower discount factors in the outsourcing
contract than in the employment contract, we must have 8 RO~ 8 RE, that is
(7)
We can then state:
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Proposition 1: i) Assume that there is investment specificity, defined as dQ > !:lP. If asset
specificity is sufficiently large, in the sense that QLis sufficiently high and/or PL is
sufficiently low, then there exist critical discount factorså RE > 8 RO > O such that for 8 > 8 RO
relational outsourcing isjirst-best and thus at least as efficient as relational employment, and
for 8 RE > 8 > 8 RO relational outsourcing is strictly more efficient than relational
employment. ii) Assume that there is no invest ment specificity (dQ < !:lP). Then for any level
of asset specificity, i.e. for any level of QL and PL' there exist critical discount factors
8 RO > 8 RE > O such that for 8 > 8 RE relational employment is first -best and thus at least as
efficient as relational outsourcing, and for 8RO > 8> 8RE relational employment is strictly
more efficient than relational outsourcing.
Proof: Given dQ > !:lP, the left hand side of (7) is srictly increasing in QL and strictly
decreasing in PL. Given dQ < !:lP , (7) never holds.
I will show, for specific functions, that (7) is also a valid condition in second-best solutions.
That is, given (7), relational outsourcing is always an equally efficient or more efficient
solution than relational employment. I assume, like BGM, that the upstream party can take
two actions:a = (apa2), and that the production functions are linear and the cost nnction
quadratic:
q(al,a2) = qlal + q2a2
(8) p(al'a2) = PIal + P2a2
( )
I 2 I 2
C al,a2 ="2al +'2a2
The first-best actions are then aIFB = qIdQ and a2FB = q2dQ . In both the outsourcing contract
and the employment contract, the upstream party chooses to maxirruze
s+bL +(qlal +q2a2)db+{3L +(plal +P2a2)d{3-taI2 -ta/, so that al =qldb+p1d{3
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and a2 = q/lb + P2df3. A ftrst-best solution can then only be achieved if db = dQ and
df3 = O
In order to keep it simple, I assume that q 2 = PI = O. The agent can take one action that
affects Q and another action that affects P.
Given (8), (7) can be written
(7') Q (dQ - M) P. fl 2 A n2 l 2 AQ( AQ A D») OL 2dQ - L - \.2P2 nr -"4 ql L.l L.l - isr ~ •
Given (7'), ftrst-best cannot be achieved if
(9)
Proposition 2: Given (7') and (8), relational outsourcing is at least as efficient as relational
employment if {)~ {)RO and strictly more efficient than relational employment if {)< {)RO.
Proof: see appendix.
The propositions suggest that outsourcing may be an efftcient response to high levels of
speciftcity. Note the relationship between asset speciftcity, investment speciftcity and
governance in proposition 1. If there is no investment speciftcity, relational outsourcing is
always an inefftcient governance mechanism compared to relational employment. Moreover,
if there is investment specificity, relational outsourcing is an efftcient response to increased
asset speciftcity.
The propositions help elucidate anecdotic empirical evidence and case studies showing that
non- integration is highly compatible with asset/investment speciftcity. And further, that
speciftcity can actually be beneftcial for non- integrated solutions. The proposition may also
cast some light on empirical studies questioning other aspects of "Williamsonian"
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explanations of integration and outsourcing. Anderson, Glenn and Sedatole (2000) make an
interesting empirical study of the relationship between asset complexity and outsourcing
decisions. Using data on 156 sourcing decisions for process tooling (des) of a new car
program, they found that attributes that according to transaction cost economics favoured
"insourcing", favours outsourcing if the parties engage in relational contracting. In particular,
they found that firms outsourced parts with high levels of complexity, and insourced simple
parts with low levels of complexity. Also, parts with high levels of "design constraints" were
more likely to be outsourced than parts with low design constraint levels. Problems of
strategic behaviour from these relational-dependent external suppliers were relatively small,
and field investigations suggested that the external suppliers were more responsive to
incentives than internal suppliers.
5. Concluding remarks
The model in this paper identifies local non-monotonic relationships between asset specificity
and vertical integration. In vertically integrated firms, there will always be some kind of
complementarity between the assets, and the assets of an upstream party vertically integrated
with its downstream buyer will always to a certain extent be specific to the downstream
party's needs. If there is no asset specificity or investment specificity, we have a competitive
market with no need for contractual incentive schemes. Then the "old rule" would apply,
saying that the best manager of an asset is its owner. So if the upstream party is the one taking
actions, he should also own the asset. But if we are in an economic environment with
significant levels of specificity, as assumed in the model of this paper, then the relationship
between asset specificity and vertical integration becomes more complex. To a certain extent,
specificity may induce integration, as the downstream party wishes to avoid unfavourable
strategic behaviour from upstream. But if the level of specificity is sufficiently high, the
relative value of external trade is reduced, and the incentive for upstream to behave
opportunistically is reduced as well. Integration may then be an inefficient governance
solution compared with non-integration: If the parties can engage in relational contracts, and
the surplus from external trade is relatively small compared with the surplus from trade in the
specific relationship, the parties will be able to design higher-powered incentive schemes if
upstream owns the asset than if downstream owns the asset.
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APPENDIX
1. The conditions for honouring the relational employment contract
The upstream party' s condition is given by
The downstream party's condition is given by
Since i=H,L and J= H,L, each of these two conditions contains four constraints. We see that
the high quality realisation always imposes the binding constraint on the downstream party,
while low quality realisation imposes the relevant constraint on the upstream party. The
relevant constraints are then:
(bL + f3 L) +su RE ;::: O
(bL +M+ f3L + Llf3) '5, oD RE
Multiplying the upstream constraint by (-1) and adding the downstream constraint yields the
following necessary and sufficient condition for honouring the relational employment
contract:
2. The conditions for honouring the relational outsourcing contract
The upstream party's condition is given by:
38 ESSAY!
The downstream party's condition is given by:
It is now less obvious which constraints are binding. But there will always be two constraints
at most that are binding. We see that it depends on the differences: 1~Q-~b and
1M-~Ø .
When 1~Q >M and 1M> !:lø , the relevant constraints are:
1(QL +!:lQ + PL +M- V) + so= s bL +!:lb+ ØL + ~ø +oURO
-}(QL +PL -V)+O(QL +!:lQq(a
RO))"2::.bL +ØL +o(bL +Mq(aRO)+ØL +!:løp(a
RO))
When 1!:lQ >M and 1M < !:lø , the relevant constraints are:
bL +!:lb+ ØL +URO "2::.1(QL+!:lQ+PL -v)+oUAO
oDRO "2::. bL + ø L + !:lø L --}(QL + PL - v)
When 1!:lQ <tsb and 1M> !:lø , the relevant constraints are:
bL + ØL +!:lØH +URO "2::.-}(QL+!:lQ+PL -v)+oUAO
oDRO "2::. bL +Sb + ø L --r(QL +PL - v)
When1~Q <tsb and 1M < !:l{3 , the relevant constraints are:
b + R +URO >.l(Q +!:lQ+P, _v)+oUAOL PL - 2 L L
Multiplying the downstream party's constraints by tI) and adding the upstream party's
constraints yields a necessary and sufficient condition for each pair of constraints:
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3. The conditions for subgame perfect equilibria:
From Selten (1965), a Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect ifthe players' strategies constitute
a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. In this game we have an infinite number of subgame
divided into three categories: The games that start after trade governed by a relational
contract, the games that start after trade governed by a spot contract, and the games that start
after no trade between the parties / trade in the alternative market. The carrot and stick
strategies constitute subgame perfect equilibrium if U (D), in case of D (U) deviation in
period t, fmds it optimal to trade under spot governance, S, in period t; refuses to trade with D
(U), i.e trades in the alternative market, A, in period t+l; and returns to relational contracting,
R, in period t+2. We can write this "punishment path" (St' At+1 ,Rt+2,Rt+3 ... ). U (D)'s feasible
set of trade actions depends on D (U)'s offer. At the end of each period, the players have
taken the same action, but in terms of feasibility A dominates S which dominates R.
There are an infmite number of strategies specifying punishment paths that could constitute
subgame perfect equilibria. With the strategies specified here, we can, however reduce the
relevant paths to (St,At+pRt+2,Rt+3' ... ) and (At'Rt+pRt+2, ... ). Recall that when identifying
the conditions for subgame perfection, it is commonly assumed that U (D) assumes that D (U)
follows his initial strategy after deviations. Hence, it is not possible for U (D) after D (U)
deviation in period t to postpone the trade in the alternative market, for instance to play
(St'St+pAt+2,Rt+3,Rt+4 ... ') since according to his initial strategy, D (U) will play A in period
t+l. Hence, in addition to the strategy specified path (St' At+pRt+2 ,Rt+3 , ... ), we are left with
the "competing" path (At' Rt+1 ,Rt+2 , ••• ). No path will include more than one period of trade in
the alternative market since A yields the lowest surplus. Also note that in the model it is
assumed that a player who reneges on the relational contract offers spot contracting instead of
direct trade in the alternative market. Then if (St' At+p Rt+2, Rt+3 , ... ) dominates
( At' Rt+p Rt+2 , ... ), deviation starting with spot contracting dominates direct trade in the
alternative market.
Relationaloutsourcing: If the downstream party reneges, the upstream party's punishment
path ( St' At+1 , Rt+2 , Rt+3, ... ) dominates ( At' Rt+1 , Rt+2 , ... ) if
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(A.l) HQ; +Pi - V) +OUAO ~ Pi - V + oURO
t.e. V~20(URO _UAO)_(Q; -Pi).
If the upstream party reneges, the downstream party's punishment path (St' At+] ,Rt+2 ,Rt+3... )
i.e, v>.Lo DRO _.l(Q - P)- 3 3 I }
For sufficiently high switching costs, the upstream party (downstream party) will play
(St' At+pRt+2 ,Rt+3 , ••• ) in case of downstream party (upstream party) deviation. For the
strategies to constitute subgame perfect equilibrium, (A.l) and (A.2) must hold for the critical
discount factor that is necessary for (6) to hold with equality. Note that for sufficiently high
levels of specificity (A.l) and (A.2) hold for v=O.
Relational employment: In relational employment, the up stream party cannot trade in the
alternative market, but he can refuse to trade by not producing the good. But if the
downstream party reneges on the contract in period t, the upstream party cannot refuse to
trade with the downstream party in this period, since he has already realized Q;. Hence the
upstream party cannot play and is thus "forced" to follow the strategy-specified punishment
If the upstream party reneges in period t, the downstream party have no incentive to
play( At' Rt+] ,Rt+2 , ... ) since in period t he can just take the realized QL. Hence, he follows the
strategy-specified punishment path (St' At+] ,Rt+2 ,Rt+3,... ).
Conclusion: The strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium if (3), (6), (A.l) and
(A.2) hold.
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4. Proof of proposition 2
For notational simplicity:
!!:.b=x
!!:.f3= Y
QL =Q
Pr =P
!!:.Q=z
!!:.P=w
q, =q
P2 = P
Given the functional forms specified in (8) and the assumption that q2 = PI = O, the surplus
from a relational contract is given by
The outsourcing constraint is given by
Geometry suggests that the solution is found m the area t z < x and -}w > y. The
maximization problem can then be written
Max S(x,y)
x,y
subject to
x-+z+-}w-y ~ 8(Q+q2xz-1q2x2 _tp2y2 _p-1p2W2)
Solving for x and y , and then substituting them into the surplus function yields
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SRO = 1 q2(8p2(Z+w)+82p2(2P+p2W2)_2)_2p2
2 82q2p2
~q2 + p2 ~ p2 + l (82 p2(q2 Z2 _ p2W2) +1+282 p2(Q_ P)-8 p2 (z + W))+~~~~~--~~~~----~--~----~~~--~~~~--~
82lp2
Let us now look at the relationa l employment contract. The constraint is given by
I I I I 5:(Q 2 l 2 2 l 2 2 )X + Y ~ u +q xz - 2" q x - 2"P Y
Geometry suggests that y = O. Assuming that x;::: O, the maximization problem can be written
MaxS(x,O)
x
Solving for x and then substituting into the surplus function yields:
Will now show that when (1') and (9) hold, we have
f(8 ,P,q,p,z }V ,Q);:::O
where
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_qlo pl z+ io plW+ 2lo lpl P+ qlo lp4W2 _ 2q2
+2J(p2 + ql)~q2 [02pl(:l-l-wl p2)+ 1+ 202(Q- P )p2 -O(w+ Z)p2] +p2
_2p2~(02q4z2 - 28q2z + 1+ 202lQ)
From (1') we have
Will now show that
f(8 ,P,q,p,z }V ,Q) ~ f(O,Po,q.p 7 }V ,Q) ~ O
for every 8 for the special case p = q =1 .
For p = q =1 we have
D ( Q) _ Q(~)_(1. 2+ 1. _1. 2)ro W,Z , - 2z 2 W 4 ZW 4 Z
and
f(O ,P,I,I, Z,W ,Q) =
-oz+8w+282p+02W2 -2+2..[iJ02Z2 _02W2 +2+282Q-282p-8w-8z)
-2J(02Z2 - 28z +1+ 202Q)
Note that Po ~ Orequires W::;;z. For P = Po(w,z Q)we get
f(8,Po(w,Z ,Q),I,I,z,w ,Q)=
[8 -02(Q++tZ)]w-oz+Ol(Q+ tZ2)- 2
+2.J2~2+02(Q+ Tz2 )-oz+[ (Q-;.+tZ)02 -O ]w-2~82 (Z2 +2Q)-28z+ 1
= A(0,z,Q)w+B(8,z,Q) -2 +2..fi.J2+B(8,z,Q)-A(8,z ,Q)w -2.JCCO,z,Q) +1
where
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A(~,z ,Q)= [1-~(Q~+!z)]~
B(~,z ,Q) = -zA(~, z,Q)
C(~,z,Q) =-2zA(~,z,Q)
Hence, it is shown that
f(~,Po(w,z ,Q),I,I,z ,w,Q)
= A(~,z,Q)( w-z)-2 +2 .Ji.J2 - A(~,z ,Q)w+ z) - 41- 2zA(~,z,Q)
For second best solutions we have from (9) that
~z+~w zs « 1222 2 122=2 2=~O(Z,Q)Q+TQz -Po(W,Z,Q)-lPW 2Q+z
Hence
A(~ ,Z ,Q) = [1-~(Q7+1Z)]~ = (1-~ t~E (O,A",),
Must also have expressions inside roots nonnegative
2 -A(~,z ,Q)(w+ z) ~ O i.e. w+z~ A(/Z{J)'
and
1-2zA(~,z,Q)~0 i.e.
Hence, we must have
i.e.
Note that
[
t: ] -~(2-Aw-Az)+.J2"* A(w-z)-2 +2v2.J2-A(w+z) =-A ~ <O
(2-Aw-Az)
Hence, the expression is minimal when w is maximal, i.e. for
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where last equality follows because .; 2:: 2z . This yields
f(8,Po(w,z ,Q),l,l, z,w ,Q) 2:: 2(-1 +J2.Jl +a -.ra) 2:: O
where a = 1- 2zA(8, Z, Q)E (0,1) , and the last inequality follows because expression is
decreasing in a on (0,1).
It remains to consider
Expression inside root is
(82z2 _82w2 +2 + 282Q- 282P-8w -8z) = 2+8[ 8 (Z2- w2)+ 28(Q -P)-(w+ z) ]
We must have
8 < IZ+Tw = Iz+1w
Q+ l 2Z2 P l p2W2 Q +1.z2 _ p_.LW2Tq - -T 2 2
i.e.
It follows tlat expression inside root above is < 2, and hence that ;p f < O.
Thus we have shown
f(8 ,P,l,l,z,w ,Q) 2:: «s.Po,l,l, z,w ,Q) 2:: O
for P:::;;Po.
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Essay
II

Human Capital and Risk Aversion in Relational
Incentive Contracts
Ola Kvaløy'
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Abstract: This paper examines a self-enforced relational incentive contract between a risk
neutral principal and a risk averse agent where the agent's human capital is essential in ex
post realization of values. I analyse the effect of outside options on the optimal bonus level,
showing how the presence of ex post outside options may impede desirable degrees of
performance pay. The effect of risk aversion and incentive responsiveness is analysed by
allowing for linear contracts. I show that the first order effect of these parameters are the
same as in verifiable contracts, but second order effects show that the optimal bonus level's
sensitivity to risk aversion and incentive responsiveness increases with the discount factor.
The analysis has interesting implications onfirm boundaries and specificity choices .
• I thank Frøystein Gjesdal, Petter Osmundsen and especially Trond E. Olsen for valuable comments and
suggestions.
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1. Introduction
The risk averse possessors of human capital experience a tight spot: as capital owners they are
automatically exposed to the incentives of the market. But as opposed to the owners of
physical capital, they cannot share the risk, and as risk averse agents they may prefer a secure
employment relationship with high fixed salary and a low degree of performance pay. An
optimal incentive contract will insulate the economic behaviour within the employment
relationship from the temptations of the outside market. An optimal contract can ensure a
wage scheme that optimally balance the need for incentives with the need for insurance, and
the risk averse agent can enjoy a high degree of fixed salary, and a lower degree of
performance pay.
But this is difficult. An incentive contract deterring any opportunistic behaviour must contain
objective verifiable criteria that are enforceable by a court of law. In most employer-worker
relationships, however, it is difficult to find objective verifiable performance measures. This
is especially the case in human capital- intensive industries. It is complicated to verify the
performance of a worker that creates values for the firm through the production of knowledge.
Hence, verifiable contracts are seldom feasible. But relational contracts ae always feasible,
constrained though by the requirement of being self-enforcing. This constraint may impede
the contract from implementing optimal solutions.
This paper studies a repeated employer-worker relationship where the worker uses his human
capital in order to generate values for the employer. I model the employment contract within a
repeated game framework where the present value of the ongoing relationship determines the
players' choice of honouring or reneging on the contract. The model is in this respect similar
to standard models of relational contracts (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro and Stiglitz,
1984; Bull 1987; Kreps 1990; Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1994, 2002). MacLeod and
Malcomson (1989) generalizes the case of symmetric information, while Levin (2003) makes
a general treatment of relational contracts with both symmetric and asymmetric information,
allowing for incentive problems due to moral hazard and hidden information.
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To my knowledge, the present paper is the first to analyse relational contracts that includes
both asymmetric information, in the form of unobservable effort, and risk aversion. It is
complicated to make defmite treatments of risk aversion in repeated game models of
relational incentive contracts, but I allow for an approximation, studying repeated linear
incentive contracts with bounded support on the noise-variable. This makes it possible to
study the effect of risk aversion and incentive responsiveness within relational contracts with
asymmetric information.
The model emphasizes the role of human capital. The challenge of contracting on human
capital lies in the subtle balance between the residual control right of the worker and the
authority of the employer. According to the standard view of ownership, it is the owner of an
asset who has residual control right over the asset; that is "the right to decide all usages of the
asset in any way not inconsistent with a prior contract, custom or law" (Hart, 1995). If the
asset involved in the worker's production is his own mind and knowledge; that is his own
human capital, then he also is to decide all non-contractual usages. This complicates the very
nature of the employment relationship, which can be seen as an implicit contractual transfer
of residual control rights from the worker to the employer. Initially, ex ante any contractual
relationship, the worker is a 'free agent' who can choose whatever behaviour he wants in
order to manage his human capital. If the agent enters into an employment relationship,
however, he accepts the employer to select his behavioural pattern. In other words: he accepts
the employer to manage his human capital. The behavioural pattern or range of actions that
the employer might require the worker to undertake is unclear and unspecified. Hence, for the
employment contract to be meaningful, the employer has to be given some rights to decide
non-contractual usages. But this right automatically conflicts with the residual control rights
of ownership. Even if the worker accepts the employer to exercise authority, the worker still
owns the asset in question, and thus has the residual control right of how to decide any non-
contractual usage.
Analytically this problem can be solved by separating two types of rights that often is
considered to be interlinked: the right to decide the management of the asset, and the right to
decide the usage of the values created by that asset. In an employment relationship where the
worker creates values for the firm with his human capital, the employer is given tbe right to
decide how the worker shall manage his human capital. He cannot choose the level of the
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worker's effort (due to problems of observing effort), but he can choose the tasks on which
the worker shall put his effort. Still the worker has the residua I control right of the ideas he
produces and thus have the chance to offer his value-added in an alternative market.
In the present paper, the worker is in some respects modelled as an independent supplier: the
worker has residual control right of ex post values since he has the opportunity to sell his
value added in the alternative market. But in some respects, he is modelled as a typical
employee: he is a risk averse agent facing a risk neutral principal. He is giving the principal
the authority to decide on his behaviour, that is, he is only allowed to exert effort along one
dimension; hence he cannot take alternative actions that exclusively improve his bargaining
position.
The large literature discussing the role of human capital in the modem corporation tends to
focus on the problem of expropriation. 1 When knowledge is the critical resource of the firm, it
may be easy for the employees to steal ideas and start their own business. The firm then has to
find ways to avoid this expropriation. Rebitzer aid Taylor (1997) argue that it may be
necessary to reward those employees with the highest threat of expropriation with higher
rents. Rajan and Zingales (2001) show how the problem of expropriation may determine the
organizational structure. They argue that human capital intensive industries will develop flat
organizations with distinctive technologies and cultures in order to avoid expropriation. The
human capital focus in this paper is different. Instead offocusing on the firm's 'battle' against
expropriation or opportunism, I focus on how the risk averse employee's possession of human
capital constrains the feasible intensity of incentives in the employment contract.
The results of the analysis can be summarized as follows: First, the model shows how ouside
options constrain the feasible levels of performance pay. If the value of the worker's outside
alternatives are low, it may impossible to implement high-powered incentives, since high
bonuses may lead the employer to renegotiate the terms of the contract ex post value
realizations. But the existence of risk aversion captures a maybe more interesting result, not
discussed in the literature: Ifthe value of the worker's outside alternatives are high, it may be
impossible to implement contracts with low-powered incentives, since the worker, if he has
l See for instance Becker (1975), Williamson (1975), Cheung (1982), Teece (1986), Mailath and PosteIwhite
(1990), Liebskind (1996).
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done a good job, has an incentive to renege on the contract and plea for a renegotiation.
Hence, even though the worker prefers a wage contract with a higher fixed salary, the
existence of good outside optons creates a lower bound on the bonus level that lies above the
desirable level. This reduces the feasible fixed salary that the employer can afford to pay.
Second, comparative static shows that the optimal bonus of the relational contract is a
negative function of risk aversion and a positive function of incentive responsiveness. Hence,
the repeated game approach is robust to the standard results from linear static incentive
contracts. But, in contrast to static contracts, the optimal bonus of the relational contract is
affected by the value of future surplus. Second-order effects show that the optimal bonus
level's sensitivity to risk aversion and incentive responsiveness increases with the discount
factor.
Third, by elucidating the dual strategic property of outside options, the model makes it
possible to systematically study the costs and benefits of relationship specificity. In particular,
the model gives the conditions for when increased specificity enhance social surplus.
Finally, the analysis slows that assumptions concemmg ex post bargaining positions is
crucial to statements on optimal firm boundaries. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2001, 2002)
provide an answer to the famous 'Williamson puzzle' (1985), by showing that incentives from
the spot market cannot always be replicated in a relational contract inside the firm, due to
problems of contract enforcement. The model in this paper shows that this argument depends
on the assumption that the worker has no control rights ex post value realizations. If the
worker' s human capital is essential for ex post realizations, the firm can always replicate the
market, but the market cannot always replicate the firm.
In the next section I will present the model. Comparative analysis is made in Section 3, while
Section 4 discusses the model' s implications on firm boundaries. Section 5 concludes.
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2. The model
Consider an employer and a worker, who together form what we can call a firm. The worker
makes an unobservable choice of effort e, which stochastically determines the worker's
output. A random variable x with mean zero and variance V represents noise between the
level of effort e and the observed output Y(e,x) = e+x. I assume that x has bounded support:
XE (XL,XH).
The worker's wage is linear in Y and given by
W= a + f3Y(e,x),
where a is a fixed salary which is paid ex ante the production of y, and f3Y(e,x)is paid ex
post the production of Y. Since the noise term, x E (x L' X H ), does not fulfil the requirements
of a normally distributed random variable, this linear incentive scheme cannot be optimal.
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) showed that normally distributed noise terms are necessary
for linear incentive contracts to be optimal. Prior to Holmstrom and Milgrom's seminal paper,
the linear incentive contract was regarded second best. Mirlees (1974) showed that the best
linear contract is inferior to various non-linear incentive contracts. In particular, a step
function contract, where the agent earns wH if Y ~ f, but WL if Y <f, can approach both
full incentives and full nsurance. As wL and f approaches zero, the agent almost surely
receives WH' and yet have incentives from fear of WL. Holmstrom and Milgrom 'rescued' the
linear contracts byenvision a sequence of actions/effort decisions influencing a corresponding
sequence of outcomes, rather than a single effort decision influencing a single outcome (for
instance one action and one outcome per day, over the course of a year). There are no
connections across days and all past outcomes are observed before the next day' s effort is
chosen. Under certain assumptions, including exponential utility and normally distributed
noise, it is optimal to repeat the same one-day contract every day, regardless of history. If the
one-day output is binary (i.e. just two possible outcomes each day), then the aggregate wage
payment for the year is a linear function of the aggregate output. With infinite number of
periods within a year, the optimal scheme is linear in output if the worker can influence the
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output within these periods. Technically the worker must then control the drift of a Brownian
motion.
But even if the model in this paper do not satisfy the normally distributed noise assumptio n,
the choice of linear contracts can still be justified both on theoretical and empirical grounds.
First, non-linear incentive contracts have the disadvantage of being susceptible to gaming. As
Gibbons (2002) argues, "the main contribution of the Holmstrom-Milgrom model is not that it
justifies linear contracts (by imposing quite strong assumptions) but rather that its sequential-
action model implicitly alerts us to gaming as a natural consequence of non-linear contracts."
For example, the Mirrlees step contract would induce no effort once the worker's aggregate
output to date passes Y. More generally, if the incentive contract for the year is a non-linear
function of the year's output, then the worker's incentives change from day to day, depending
on the aggregate output to date. Linear incentive contracts have the advantage of preventing
these kinds of dynamic moral hazard problems, or 'gaming problems', within a period. A
growing body of evidence is consistent with the prediction that non-linear contracts create
history-dependent incentives, see for instance Healy (1985) on bonus plans with ceilings and
floors, and Asch (1990) and Oyer (1998) on bonuses tied to quotas.
Moreover, the simplicity of linear contracts makes it reasorable to believe that costs
associated with the implementation of such contracts are lower than the costs associated with
more complex non-linear contracts. The gaming problem can also contribute to excessive
costs due to the implementation of non-linear contracts. The popularity of linear contracts
makes it reasonable to believe that excessive costs associated with non-linear contracts exist,
especially since it is hard to fmd empirical evidence for one of the optimum conditions of
linear contracts; normally distributed noise. Hence, for the rest of this paper I will assume that
excessive costs associated with the implementation of non-linear incentive contracts exceed
the benefits. This assumption is particularly reasonable in risk averse environments as
considered in this paper. Since risk aversion and variance increases the complexity of non-
linear contracts, and also make the gaming problem more severe, the costs associated with
implementing non-linear incentive contracts are most likelyapositive function of these
variables.
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Assume that the worker's utility from wage is given by u(w), where u is three times
differentiable, and the expected wage is equal to its mean, that is iii = E[ w]. The worker's
certainty equivalent is then assumed to be
where r = r(w) = -u "(w) /u '(w) is the worker' s coefficient of absolute risk aversion,
V = Varew) ,and C (e) is the personal cost of making effort, where C '(e) > O and C "(e) > O.
The formulation of the certainty equivalent is a Taylor approximation (see appendix).
The employer's certainty equivalent can now be written
CEe =e-(a + f3e),
and total certainty equivalent (TeE) is then CEw +CEe, that is
2.1 Verifiable contract
If the parties could write a verifiable contract on output level and the ownership of the output,
they could easily implement the optimal division of incentives and insurance. The worker
maximizes his certainty equivalent. The first order condition yields the following incentive
constraint:
(1) f3 = dede
The employer now maximizes the total certainty equivalent by choice of f3, subject to the
incentive constraint. That is
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subject to (1)
Solving this for f3 yields
(2)
A 1
f3 = 1+ r VC" '
where ~"can be interpreted as tre worker's responsiveness to incentives( ;; = ~). From (2)
we obtain the classical result that the optimal level of performance pay is a negative function
of risk aversion and variance and a positive function of incentive responsiveness.
2.2 Relational Contract
Assume now that the worker' s output is not verifiable, and thus not enforceable by a court of
law. Further on, the parties cannot write verifiable contracts ex ante on ownership rights ex
post. The parties then have to agree on a ælf-enforcing relational contract. The worker's
choice of effort is equivalent to an investment in human capital that is essential in the ex post
realization of output y, and there exist no verifiable contract that can force the worker to
realize internal trade. Hence, the worker can threaten ex post to trade the output with external
trading partners. Assume that the alternative market values the effort of the worker to be
8Y(e,x) where 8E (0,1).
The game between the worker and the employer now proceeds as follows: first the employer
offers a compensation package (a, f3 ), where a is a fixed salary to be paid ex ante the
production of y, and f3 y is the bonus meant to be paid ex post the realization of Y. Second,
the worker makes a choice of effort e. Third, the employer and the worker observe Y. They
now decide if they still want to accept the bonus element (f3) of the compensation package,
or if tæy want to renegotiate the compensation scheme.
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Assume that 50:50 Nash bargaining decides the price of the good if one of the parties chooses
to renegotiate the contract. 2 The price is then Y+:Y, leaving a bonus element equivalent
to 1~9 =r .In a single-period relationship, the worker will choose to renegotiate if {3 < r ,and
the employer will choose to renegotiate if {3 > r, so the players will ex ante agree to a 50:50
Nash compensationyf . In other words: a relational contract where {3 *- r is not enforceable.
To be able to implement a relational contract, the players must have an infinite horizon (or an
uncertainty with respect to when the relationship ends). To formalize this, I consider an
infmitely repeated relationship between the worker and the employer, where they both play
trigger strategies. The employer begins by offering a compensation package (a, {3). The
employer will continue to do so unless the worker or the employer chooses to renegotiate ex
post, in which case they refuse to agree on anything else than the 50:50 Nash compensation
rY, hereafter called a spot contract, forever after.3 (Note that even if we now enter into the
study of repeated relationships, the moral hazard problem cannot be solved as in Radner,
1981, Rogersen, 1985, and Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1990), since, in contrast to
these models, the parties cannot write verifiable contracts.)
Given the employer's strategy, if the worker accepts the bonus element of the contract, the
present value of his expected profit is given by
where superscript, R, denotes relational contract, 8 denotes the discount factor and e"
maximizes the certain equivalent such that CE wR =Max( a + {3e - C (e) - +r{32V). If the
e
2 The 50:50 Nash bargaining solution is quite common in the literature ( see e.g. Grossrran and Hart 1986;
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 2002). Most bargaining solutions are ex post Pareto-optimal as long as bargaining
is costless and information is symmetric (see e.g. Rubenstein 1982). Anyway, the qualitative results in this paper
will not change ifwe allow for another division of the surplus.
3 This trigger strategy has the advantage of being simple to analyse, but it also has the disadvantage of not
regarding the issues of optimal punishment and renegotiation. Abreu (1988) shows that the highest equilibrium
pay offs require the strongest credible punishment. In the model in section 2 the punishment of deviation is not
the strongest, but the results of the model would hold even with optimal punishment, since the simple idea is that
cooperation depends on the present value of the relationship. See Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) for a
similar argument.
The problem of renegotiation is that renegotiation from punishment is Pareto-efficient. One can meet this
problem by arguing that a new relational contract, after deviation and renegotiation, could not be established on
the same self-enforcing terms, since the threat of infinite punishment would not seem credible. See Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991) for a discussion on renegotiation proofness.
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worker reneges on the contract, and calls for a renegotiation, the present value of his expected
profit is given by
() (R ) se'Es4 re +x +"'j:8 w'
where superscript, S, denotes spot contract, and eS maximizes the worker's surplus from spot
transactions, such that es." =max (re - C(e) -irr2V).
e
The worker will stick to the original compensation package if
(5) 'v'x.
Given the worker's strategy, if the employer sticks to the original compensation package. the
present value of his expected profit is given by
(6) (1- f3)(eR + x) + l~S eE: ,
where CE: = e" - (a + f3eR). If the employer reneges on the contract, and calls for a
renegotiation, the present value of his expected profit is given by
(7) (1- r)(eR + x) + l~S CEe S
where CEes = I-ri.
The employer will stick to original compensation package if
(8) (l-r)(eR +x)+tiCE/ 'v'x.
Combining (5) and (8) yields a necessary and sufficient condition for the relational contract to
be self-enforcing:
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where .:ix = x H - X L •
That is
(9) Ir - PI.:ix ~ 1~8 (TCER - TCEs),
The parties can choose the fixed salary, a , to make the condition sufficient.
3. Comparative Analysis
From (9) we observe that there are upper and lower bounds on the feasible level of
performance pay. Defme pRE (PL,f3 H) as the feasible levels of performance pay in a
relational linear incentive contract.
Proposition 1: The feasible levels of performance pay P E (PL' PH) in a relational linear
incentive contract are given by (9).
The proposition clarifies the limits of relational contracting. In a verifiable contract, any level
of PE (0,1) is feasible, and the optimal choice is independerr on outside options and discount
factors. In a relational contract relying on self-enforceability, however, ex post outside
options and the value from future trade, constrains the feasible P . In spirit, the proposition is
similar to Levin (2003). He shows that if the agent is risk neutral, the optimal relational
incentive contract is non-linear, where a bonus is paid if output exceeds a criticallevel. Due to
risk neutrality, the strongest possible incentives are desirable, but self-enforcement imposes a
lower and an upper bound on the critical output level. I show that if the agent is risk averse,
and the parties stick to linear contracts, the feasible levels of performance pay have a lower
and an upper bound P E (PL' PH)' From the concavity of TeE, we have
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Lemma: The optimal bonus level of a relational linear incentive contract is given by ø iff
where f3 rif3 L ;;:::{3 is given by
(10) v=Llx 1-/ .
Hence,
Corollary: There exist levels of r,Ax, 8, r, Vand C' ,where the optimallevel of performance
pay in a verifiable linear incentive contract cannot be implemented in a relational linear
incentive contract, that is ø e (f3 L' f3 H ).
It is naturally most interesting to study the properties of relational incentive contracts when
ø e (f3 L' f3 H)·4 When ø > f3 H > r the employer has short-term gains from contract deviation.
In order to commit to the contract, the employer cannot provide the worker with sufficiently
high-powered incentives. This point is made in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002): High-
powered incentives cannot be implemented if the reneging temptations are too large.
But the problem can also be that the employer cannot provide the worker with incentives that
are too low-powered. When ø < f3 L <r , it is the worker who has the short-term gains from
contract deviation. In order to deter deviation, the employer must offer f3 = f3 L ex ante to
4 It can be objected that the linear contract approximation is unrealistic when the parties cannot even implement
the optimal slope of the linear contract. But the corollary above applies especially for higher levels ofr and/or V,
and as previously argued, it is reasonable to believe that costs associated with implementing non-linear incentive
contracts is a positive function ofrisk aversion and variance.
64 ESSAY!!
meet the worker' s ex post outside opportunities. In order to earn profit he then has to reduce
the fixed salarya . Hence, if the worker is risk averse, and ø < {3L' then good ex post outside
options is a 'burden' for the worker: even though the worker prefers a wage contract with a
higher fixed salary, the ex post realization ofvalue added automatically creates a lower bound
on the bonus level, which again reduce the feasible fixed salary that the employer can afford
to pay. In such, the model explains the existence of excessive bonuses in human capital-
intensive industries where the workers are highly exposed to the incentives of the market (see
e.g. Blair and Roe, 1999). Moreover the model cast light on the modem stress phenomenon in
human capital intensive industries where employees experience so-called 'burnout' after
working '24 hours a day' (see e.g. ZDnet.com or MetaGroup.com for reports on this
phenomenon).
By modelling the relational contract as a linear incentive contract, we are able to make
comparative static on the effect of risk aversion, variance and incentive resporisiveness on the
optimal bonus level when ø e: ({3 L' {3H ). Let k be a parameter in the cost function, and a
measure of incentive responsiveness in the following sense: For e({3, k) given by
{3= ~~(e, k), we have l~p> O. That is, the incentive responsiveness :; increases with
increasing k (see appendix for more details). We obtain
Proposition 2: The optimal bonus level of a relational linear incentive contract is a negative
function of risk aversion and variance, and a positive function of incentive responsiveness.
Th . ap ap O ap O d ap, - apl O ap, O . H L
i , at IS ;;- =av< ,ar > an ar - av < ,ar- > ,l = , .
Proof: See appendix
This is not a surprising result as it replicates the standard result from verifiable linear
incentive contracts. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the robustness of the infmite repeated game
approach.
In relational contracts, as opposed to verifiable contracts, the optimal bonus' sensitivity to
changes in risk aversion, variance and incentive responsiveness is affected by the discount
factor. On low discount factors, the relational contract is veaker, and the range of feasible
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bonus levels is smaller (f3 H - f3 L is smaller). This implies that the optimal bonus level is less
sensitive to parameter-changes when ø e: (f3 L' f3 H ), and contrary:
Proposition 3: When ø e: (13 L' f3 H ), the higher the discount factor 8, the stronger is the
effect of risk aversion, variance and incentive responsiveness on the optimal bonus level of
the relational contract. That is I~,1$1= I;:å I> O and :~ > O, i = H, L.
Proof: See appendix
Proposition 3 implies that the 'burden of outside options' is hardest in low trust environments
(see Hart, 2001, on interpreting the discount factor as a proxy for trust). Ifø < 13L ~ r and the
parties heavily discount the relationship's future surplus, high levels of risk aversion or low
levels of incentive responsiveness cannot 'free' the worker from high levels of performance
pay.
3.1 Relationship specificity
When the optimal bonus of the verifiable contract, ø, cannot be implemented, the parties
have incentives to adjust the specificity of the relationship in order to implement more
efficient incentive schemes. That is, the parties have incentives to take investrrents that adjust
r. They can reduce r by relationship specific investments, for instance in firm specific
training programs. And they can increase rby standardizing output or generalizing tre skill
of the worker. Of course, the parties must balance the gains from adjusting rwith its costs.
Figure 1 shows (9) for ø < f3 L < r. The curved line shows TeER • The horizontalline shows
res". These lines intercept where TeER = res' and 13 = r. The chord shows the left hand
side of (9) multiplied with l~O, where l~O & = v decide its gradient. The feasible 13 is in the
region where the curved line lies above the chord, that is between f3 L and r = f3 H on the
horizontal axis, where f3 L is decided by the parameters.
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Figure 1
From figure 1 we see if ø < f3 L <r , a marginal increase in rwould reduce f3 L (since the
gradient of the chord is unaffected) and thus increase social surplus. An increase in r
increases the worker's short-term gain from deviating (given positive realizations of output
Y), but it also a makes the future spot contract less attractive. On high discount factors, this
strengthens the relational contract and makes it possible to negotiate a better-termed incentive
scheme. lfthe discount factor is sufficiently low (the chord sufficiently steep), however, then
the only feasible incentive scheme has bonus equal to r, and the parties can only increase
social surplus by lowering r. Hence, in high trust environments, the parties would increase
outside options, i.e. reduce the level of relationship specificity in order to implement more
efficient incentive schemes, while in low trust environments, the parties must reduce outside
options, i.e. increase the specificity level in order to increase social surplus. This relationship
prevails when it is the worker who has short-term incentives to deviate from the contract; that
is when ø < f3L < r· When r < ø , the story is reverse:
------------ --------------------- --------- ------------------------------- ~
TCE
Figure 2
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f3
Figure 2 shows (9) when r < f3H < j3 . Now we see that a marginal decrease in rwould
increase f3H' and thus increase social surplus. Here, an increase in r would make the spot
contract more attractive, and hence decrease the flexibility of the relational contract. If the
discount factor is sufficiently low, however, the parties can only increase social surplus by
increasing r. Hence, in high trust environments, the parties would reduce the worker' s
outside options, i.e. increase the level of relationship specificity in order to increase social
surplus, while in low trust environments, the parties must increase outside options, i.e. reduce
the specificity level in order to increase social surplus.
Figure 1 and 2 show the costs and benefits of relationship specificity. It can lead to
opportunism, which is emphasized by transaction rost economists (see e.g Klein, Crawford,
Alchian, 1978), but relationship specificity can also be a commitment device (see Holmstrom,
Roberts, 1998), and lead to more efficient incentive schemes (Kvaløy, 2003). Moreover, the
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analysis complements parts of Milgrom and Holmstrom (1991). They argue that the principal
must restrict outside activities in order to implement efficient incentive schemes, especially
when performance in the tasks that benefits the firm are hard to measure and reward. I show
that not only the principal, but also the risk averse agent with essential human capital may
have incentives to reduce outside options if it enables the principal to commit to a higher
fixed salary.
Formally, figure 1 and 2 show:
Proposition 4: If j3 < f3 L < r, then there exist a discount factor S > 8"so that al~/>Oand
S < 8"so that a~E < o. If r < f3 H < ø, then there exist a discount factor S >8so that
aTCE < O and 5: < f so that aTCE > Oay' uu ay.
The proposition exposes an interesting relationship between trust-level, reneging temptations
and social surplus. In high trust environments, social surplus is increased by increasing short-
term gain from reneging on the contract. Intuitively, this insight applies more generally.
Increased outside temptations may strengthen an already 'solid' relationship.
4. The boundaries of the firm
As I indicate, the simple economic environment outlined in this paper may cast light on the
puzzle of firm boundaries. When I introduce Section 2 saying that the employer and the
worker "form what we can call a firm", I anticipate what is usually called an employment
relationship. This may seem inaccurate since the worker has the residual control right.
Following Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002), the relationship considered in this paper
should be described as relational outsourcing: the parties engage in a relational contract, not a
spot contract, and the worker (the upstream party) has the residual control right of the asset.
When I still choose to characterize the relationship as an employment relationship, and thus a
"firm", it comes from the assumption that the worker cannot take actions jhat exclusively
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change the value of the outside option. 5 Hence, in this setting, as long as the parties engage in
a relational contract, I will interpret the relationship as a firm, Once the parties decide to
deviate from the contract and instead engage in a spot contract, however, the relationship can
be considered as a market transaction. The question is then: when will the parties form a firm?
Assume that there is a direct cost of relational contracting. This can be, for instance, the cost
of fmding the right balance between bonus level and fixed salary." The model predicts that the
parties will form a firm when the gains of writing contracts exceed the cost. What, then, are
the gains of relational contracting? Well, it enables the parties to implement more efficient
incentive schemes than the spot market agreement. But as we have seen in section 2, these
gains vary. If the optimal bonus level is equal to the incentives of the spot market; that is
ø =r= f3 S , then there is no need for a relational contract to implement it. Hence, the parties
will not form a firm. If ø::f::. f3 S , then there exists a gain from engaging in a relational
contract. If ø is close to f3 S , then the gains from relational contracting may be rather small.
Also, if ø < f3 L and the efficiency loss from not being able to implement ø, is great, the
gains from relational contracting will be small. We can formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 5: Let <I> denote the direct cost of relational contracting. The gains from
relational contracting are given by TeE R - TeE S =Q. Theparties will form afirm if Q > <I> •
Proposition 5 is ndeed in the spirit of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985) as it sees firm
boundaries as a question of transactional and contractual costs and benefits. But as oppose to
Williamson, I do not claim that the possibility of opportunism (deviation) is greater il the
market than in the firm. In fact, the possible gains from opportunism may be greater in the
relational contracting of the firm. Avoiding the possibility of hold up is inevitable, since the
worker' s human capital is essential in the ex post realization of firm value. Also, I do not
claim that the incentives are necessarily more powerful in the market. The point is that the
incentives of the spot market are more or less costless to implement, but less flexible in range.
This is an amendment to Baker, Gibbons and Murphy's (2001, 2002) solution to the
5 This interpretation corresponds to Herbert Simon's (1951) conception of the employment relationship: the
parties engage in an employment relationship ifthe worker accepts the employer to exercise authority over the
worker; that is the employer is given the authority to select the worker's behavior pattern.
6 It is common to contrast the costly verifiable contracts with the costless relational contracts, but there may be
direct costs associated with any kinds of contracting, regardless ofhow the contract is enforced.
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Williamson puzzle, asking why one cannot replicate the market inside a firm. BGM show that
incentives from the spot market cannot always be replicated in a relational contract inside the
firm, due to problem; of contract enforcement. The model in this paper shows that this
argument depends on the assumption that the worker has no control rights ex post value
realizations. If the worker's human capital is essential for ex post realizations, the firm can
always replicate the market, but the market cannot always replicate the firm. Hence, in human
capital- intensive industries, the question is not if it is possible to provide "spot market
incentives" inside the firm, but how costly it is to develop optimal incentive contracts instead
of relying on the costless high-powered incentives of the spot market.
5. Concluding remarks
The problem of human capital is usually considered to be a problem of expropriation. This is
primarilya problem in a risk neutral environment. If the worker is risk neutral, or if he has the
chance to share risk with other employees, he may be tempted to take a good idea with him
and start his own business. But the worker is often risk averse, and he cannot easily share the
risk of possessing his own human capital. Still, if the worker cannot write verifiable contracts
with his employer, the threat of expropriation or incessant renegotiation is underlying the
employment relationship. The goal with this paper has been to show how a problem ofwriting
verifiable incentive contracts with risk averse possessors of human capital constrains the
feasible intensity of incentives, and moreover how this have implications for specificity
choices and firm boundaries.
The choice of analysing the employment relationship in the framework of an infinitely
repeated game deserves a comment: This approach rests on the assumption of the self-
interested rational "economic man". Empirical research suggests, however, that individuals
often behave in a more reciprocal manner (see Fehr and Gachter, 2000, for an overview).
Reciprocity may imply co-operation in the one shot trust game, or a smaller threshold for
cooperation in the dynamic game, but it may also imply a more severe punishment than what
can be expected from the rational agent. Introducing reciprocity in the environment outlined
in the previous section could moderate the predictions. If the employer offered a
compensation package with a high fixed salary and a smaller bonus, the reciprocal employee
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could choose to accept the compensation even if the ex post outside opportunities were huge.
This behaviour could stem from the employee's loyalty to the employer. Such kind of loyalty
may explain the stable long-term employment relationships one has observed in many
industries. Recent studies suggest, however, that loyalty is eroding, especially in the human
capital-intensive industries (see O'Connor, 1993 and Capelli, 2000). The self-interested
rational agent may therefore work as a useful abstraction in dealing with human capital in the
modem corporation.
APPENDIX
1. Deducing the worker's certainty equivalent CEw = a + f3e- C(e) -trf32V
The worker' s utility from wage is given by u( w), where u is three times differentiable, and
the expected wage is equal to its mean, that is w = E[ w]. Let us first leave out personal cost
C(e). The certainty equivalent is then approximately
w-1'r(W)Var(w) = w,
where r (w) = -u n(w) fu '(w)
Derivation (from Mi/grom and Roberts, 1992):
According to Taylor's theorem, for any z we have
u(z) = u(w)+ (z - w)u '(w)+1(z -wYun(W)+ R(z),
where R(z) =u"'(i)(z-wi f6for some ZE [w,z]. This last term fl assumed to be small and
thus negligible. Hence, we can write approximately
u(z) ""u(w)+ (z - w)u '(w)+1(z _w)2un(W).
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Substituting w for z and computing the expectation, we fmd, approximately
E[u(w)] "" u(w)+ E[ w- w]u '(w)++E[ (w -W)2JU"(W).
Since E[w-w]=E[w]-w=w -W=O, we can write
(A.l) E[u(w)] ""u(w)+tE[(w-wiJu"(w).
The certainty equivalent w is expected to be close to w, so its utility is approximated
differently, also using Taylor's theorem,
(A.2) u(w) =u(w)+(w- W)u'(w)+R(w)
where R(w) =~u "(i)( w- W)2 for some ZE [w, w]. If we apply the approximation only when
w-w is small, the remainder term is again negligible. Since w is a certainty equivalent, we
have u(w) = E[u(w)]. So combining (A.l) and (A.2) yields
(w- w)u'(w) "" tE[(w- W)2JU"(W).
This can be expressed in the form
w-w ""Hu "(w)/u '(w)] E[(w- W)2J =-tr(w)Var(w),
which establishes w = iii- -}r (wYa r( w) .
Subtracting personal cost, and insert for w = E[ w] =a+ {3e, we obtain the worker's certainty
equivalent
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CEw = a + f3e- C(e) -trf32V.
2. Deducing (9)
Since x is continuous, (5) and (8) includes infmite number ofrestrictions. But using bounded
support on x, we can fmd the binding constraints, analysing (5) and (8) for extreme
realizations of x.
When f3::;; y, (5) is weakest for X = xH and (8) is weakest for X = XL. The binding constraints
arethus
(A.3) f3(eR +XH)+ I!O CEw
R
;:::
(A.4) (1- f3)(eR + xL)+ I~O CE: ;:::
y(eR +XH)+ I!O CE./
(l-y)(eR +XL)+-6-CE/
A necessary condition for the relational contract to hold is that the sum of (A.3) and (A.4)
holds. This yields
When f3;::: y, (5) is weakest for X = XL and (8) is weakest for x = xH • The binding constraints
arethus
y(eR +XL)+I!OCEw
S
(l-y)(eR +XH)+-6-CE/,
and the sum of (A.6) and (A.7) yields
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Since (A.S) is relevant for 13 ~ y and (A.8) is relevant for 13 ~ y we can write these to
restrictions in one expression using absolutes:
where Llx = xH - XL' As noted, the parties <an choose the fixed salary, a, to make the
condition sufficient.
3. The measure of incentive responsiveness
For e(f3, k) given by 13 = ~~(e, k), we have at;ø >O. That is, the incentive resporsiveness
;; increases with increasing k. This holds if the cost function satisfies £at ~~f- ~la~~k > O.
(Example, the condition holds for a cost function of the form C(e,k)= A(k)en,n~ 2, where
A' (k) <O). With this condition, the gain from a marginal increase in 13 increases with the
level of incentive responsiveness. That is ~~~5= (1- 13) ~~ >Ofor 13 < 1.
4. Proof proposition 2 and 3
When 13 E (13 L' 13H )the optimal 13 is grven by (2) showing that the optimal level of
performance pay is a negative function of risk aversion and variance and a positive function
of incentive responsiveness. From Lemma we have that 13L is optimal iff f3 < 13L ~ r
where 13L is given by
(lO) v =Llx )-0o
. When f3 < f3L < ywe must have (for simplicity I exclude functional arguments):
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(A.9) - aTf( Ip=lh < v
This is visualized in figure (1). The chord is steeper than the TeE R curve at point f3 L •
Differentiating (10) with respect to r yields
From (A.9), the bracket on the left hand side is negative, and the difference on the right hand
side is positive since f3 L < rand a~:aff< o. This yields a:rL < O, which also implies ~: < O.
Differentiating (10) with respect to k yields
(A 11) (-v _ aTCER) apL = arCER _ arCES. ap ak dk ak
From (A.9), the bracket on the left hand side is negative, and the difference on the right hand
side is also negative since f3 L <Y and a;[cfl >o. This yields a:: >O.
From lemma we have that f3H is optimal iff ø > f3H ~ y, where f3H is given by
When ø > f3H ~ Y we must have
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This is visualized in figure (2). The chord is steeper than the TCE R curve at point f3H .
Differentiating (11) with respect to r yields
(A 13) (v- aTCER)a{3H = aTCER _aTCES. a(3 ar ---ar- ar
From (A12), the bracket on the left hand side is positive, and the difference on the right hand
side is negative since f3H > r and a~Ja~E<O. This yields a:; <O, which also implies a:; <O.
Differentiating (11) with respect to k yields
(A14) (v-Æff-)~= aTft-¥
From (A12), the bracket on the left hand side is positive, and the difference on the right hand
side is also positive since f3H > r and aaJa~E> O. This yields a:; > O .
Proposition 3 can be verified by differentiating (AIO), (All) (A13) and (A14) with respect
to v noting that ~ < O .
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Team Incentives in Relational Contracts
Ola Kvaløy'
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Abstract: Incentive schemes for teams are compared. I ask: under which conditions are
relational incentive contracts based on joint performance evaluation, relative performance
evaluation and independent performance evaluation self-enforceable. Theframework of Che
and Yoo (2001) on team incentives is combined with the framework of Baker, Gibbons and
Murphy (2002) on relational contracts. In a repeated game between one principal and two
agents, I find that incentives based on relative or independent performance are expected to
dominate when the productivity of effort is high, while joint performance evaluation
dominates when productivity is low. Incentives based on independent performance are more
probable if the agents own critical assets or are able to collude .
• I thank Frøystein Gjesdal, Petter Osmundsen, seminar participants at the Norwegian School of Economic and
Business Administration, and especially Trond E. Olsen for valuable comments and suggestions.
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1. Introduction
In the last decade we have seen a growth of group based incentive schemes such as profit
sharing, gain ffiaring and employee ownership schemes to improve motivation and labour
relations. It is recognized in private industry that by introducing group incentive
compensation systems, it may be possible to induce workers to work both harder and more
cooperatively, in a way that enhance their productivity (see Banker, Field, Schroeder and
Sinha, 1996; Gerhardt, Minkoff and Olsen, 1995). Yet there has been paid little attention to
group incentives in the economics literature. The main reason for this lack of theoretical
interest is that it has been difficult to prove the efficiency of such schemes. Economists
studying teams, beginning with Alchian and Demsetz (1972), have argued that group
incentives are ineffective due to free-riding problems. If you award an equal bonus to each
member of a team on the basis of the team' s overall performance, it may give each member
an incentive to shirk (free ride). It is not difficult to see that if the members of a team are
interacting only once (for example in one project only) aid each one knows that this is the
one and only project of which they will work together, the free riding problem can easily
occur. In such a static one period relationship an incentive scheme based on relative
performance evaluation (RPE) is optimal (see Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Holmstrom, 1982;
Mookherjee, 1984). An RPE scheme rewards team members that perform relatively better
than their peers. That wayan employer can make a worker's compensation independent from
good or bad outside factors (common noise components). This lowers the cost ofproviding a
given level of incentives. The RPE scheme also has the advantage that one only needs to
detect relative performance, which can be easier than measuring absolute performance.
In recent years, however, economists have been able to show that joint performance
evaluation (JPE) may come out as an optimal solution. A JPE scheme compensates the group
members if the group as a whole performs well. Hence, a worker is rewarded if his peers
perform well. The value of encouraging employees' cooperation is emphasized in works such
as Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990), Itoh (1992, 1993), Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo
(1993) and particular Kandel and Lazear (1992) who emphasize the effect ofpeer pressure. In
addition, tbe folk theorem of repeated games has for some years now provided a possible
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answer to the free rider critique of group incentives (see Radner, 1986; Weitzman and Kruse,
1990; and FitzRoy and Kraft, 1995). In a repeated setting where agents interact in an
unknown number of periods, shirking from some desired, co-operative solution can be
deterred by social sanctions including withholding co-operation in the future. This idea is
most elegantly formalized by Che and Yoo (2001). They show how an implicit contract
between the agents of a team can generate implicit incentives and thus make joint
performance evaluation optimal.
But even if group incentives have gained popularity, we still see a high frequency of
individual compensation schemes based on relative or independent performance evaluation
(IPE). This is especially the case for white collar workers (Prendergast, 1999) and workers in
higher levels of organizations (see Appelbaum and Berg, 1999). In the present paper I
combine the framework of Che and Y00 on team incentives with the framework of Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy (BGM) on relational contracts' to show when relative performance
evaluation and independent performance evaluation (IPE) is expected to dominate in repeated
transactions. Like Che and Y00 I study a repeated game between one principal and two
agents, but contrary to them, I model a self-enforcing relational contract between the principal
and his agents. Contrary to Che and Y00, I assume that the quality of the agents' output is
non-verifiable, so that legal enforcement is impossible. Like Che and Yoo, I compare three
types of incentive schemes: Relative performance evaluation, joint performance evaluation
and independent performance evaluation. But instead of focusing on optimality conditions, I
focus on enforceability conditions: under which conditions are the various incentive schemes
implementable? Since the parties only can choose incentive schemes among the enforceable
ones, the results of my model often differs from Che and Y00' s results.
In Section 2 and 3 I analyse an environment where collusion is impossible, and where the
principal owns the assets so that the agents do not have the possibility to hold-up any values
ex post production. The main result from these sections is that when jroductivity of effort
l 'Relational' contracts and 'implicit' contracts are used synonymously in the literature. MacLeod and
Malcomson (1989), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) and Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995) used 'implicit', while
Bull (1987) used both 'implicit' and 'relational'. Newerpapers such as Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) and
Levin (2003) use 'relational', inspired by the legalliterature, particularly MacNeil (1978). Since implicit
contracts can be interpreted as vaguer than relational contracts (due to the antonym implicit versus explicit), I
will in this paper use the term 'implicit' on the contract between the agents (like Che and Yoo), since it is most
natural to think about this contract as a verbal informal agreement. But I will use 'relational' on the contract
between the principal and his agents, since this most likely is a formally written wage contract.
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increases, the enforceability of IPE and RPE rises relatively to the enforceability of JPE. In
general, an increase in productivity raises the cost of deviation, and the discount factor is
allowed to decrease without running the risk of deviation. But JPE is vulnerable to low
discount factors. Since the efficiency of JPE is dependent on the possibility for repeated
interaction among the agents, the necessary JPE incentives increase with lower discount
factors. Hence, higher productivity weakens the enforceability of JPE relatively to RPE and
IPE.
In Section 4 I briefly discuss the implications of collusion. In particular, I show that
independent performance evaluation may turn out as optimal if the agents are able to collude.
In Section 5 I consider the situation when the agents own the critical assets. I show that the
possibilities for agents to renegotiate the terms of trade ex post the realizations of values,
makes incentives based on non-independent performance evaluation harder to enforce. This
opens for independent performance evaluation to dominate.
The empirical relevance of the model is discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2. The model
First I will replicate the repeated setting in Che and Yoo's model. Consider an economic
environment consisting of one principal and two identical agents who each period produce
either high, QH' or low, QL' values for the principal. Their effort level can be either high or
low, where high effort has a disutility cost of c and low effort is costless. The principal can
only observe the realization of the agents' output, not the level of effort they choose. But the
agents can observe each other's effort decisions. Their output depends on effort decisions as
well as a common environmental shock. A favourable shock occurs with probability a E (0,1),
in which case both agents produce high values for the principal. If the shock is unfavourable,
the probability for agent i of realizing QH is q H if the agent's effort is high and qL if the
agent' s effort is low, where qH > qL •
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Agent i receives a fixed payment, a, prior to (ex ante) value realizations.i where a can be
both positive and negative. A bonus wage vector Oi == (13 iHH, 13 iHL, 13 iLH, 13 iLL) where the
subscripts denote respectively agent i and agent j' s realization of Qi' (i = H ,L ), is to be paid
ex post the realizations of values. It assumed that all parties are risk neutral, except that the
agents are subject to limited liability: the principal cannot impose negative bonus wages.
Limited liability may arise forn liquidity constraints or from laws that prohibit firms from
exacting payments from workers.3
Let agent i and j choose efforts ke{H,L}and le {H,L} respectively. Agent i's expected
wage is then
(1)
n(k,I,Oi) ==a+ (a + (l-aIJkq/ )f3iHH
+(1-a)[qk(1- q/)f3illL +(I-qk)q/f3iLH +(1-qk)(1-q/)f3iLL]
For each agent, a wage scheme exhibits joint performance evaluation if
(13 HH' 13LH) > (13 HL' 13LL) ,4 (I suppress superscript since the agents are symmetric). In this
case n(k,H;O»n(k,L;O)so an agent's work yields positive externalities to his partner. A
wage scheme exhibits relative performance evaluation if (13 HH, 13LH) < (13 HL, 13LL). In this
case n(k,H;O) < ntk, L; O) so an agent's work generate a negative externality on his partner.
A wage scheme exhibits independent performance evaluation if
(f3HH,f3LH)=(f3HL,f3LL)which implies n(k,H;O)=n(k,L;O), so an agent's work has no
impact on his partner.
It is assumed that high effort is sufficiently valuable to the principal that he always prefers to
induce the agents to exert high effort. The principal' s problem is then to minimize the wage
payments subject to the constraints that the agents must be induced to yield high effort. In a
repeated setting, the agents can exploit the fact that they are able to observe each other' s effort
decisions. In particular, they can playa repeated game where they both play high effort if the
2 Che and Y00 do not include fixed payments in their model.
3 Limited liability in terms ofliquidity constraints does not conflict with the possibility of a negative fixed
payment since the fixed payment is paid ex ante. Also, a law against exacting payment ex post can still permit
voluntary payments from workers ex ante.
4 The inequality means weak inequality of each component and strict inequality for at least one component.
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other agent played high effort in the previous period. In order for such a strategy to constitute
a subgame perfect equilibrium, we must have
(2) I~O (n (H ,H; 0)- c)"2::.n(L,H;fi) + I~O min {n(L,L;O),n(L If ;O},
where 8 is the discount factor. The left hand side shows the expected present value of
playing high effort, while the right hand side shows the expected wage from unilaterally
playing low effort in one period and being subsequently punished by the worst possible
equilibrium payoff. Hence, (2) says that, given the strategy to play high effort if the other
agent played high effort in the previous period, an agent will play high effort as long the
present value from playing high effort is greater than the present value from playing low
effort. Note that (2) is a necessary but not sufficient condition. For (2) to be sufficient, the
punishment path specified on the right hand side must also be self-enforcing.
Observe that in a JPE scheme, n(L,H;O) > n(L,L;O). Thus the right hand side of (2)
becomes n(L,H;O)+ I~O n(L,L;O). In an RPE scheme, however, n(L,L;O) > n(L,H;O), so
the right hand side of (2) is reduced to l~on(L,H;O)which makes (2) coinciding with the
static incentive constraint (see Che and Yoo). Hence, we see that repeated interaction between
the agents can increase the punishment of playing low effort in a JPE scheme, but not in an
RPE scheme. The intuition is straightforward: in the JPE scheme, low effort from agent i does
not only imply a reduced chance for him to realize high values, but it also implies that his
peer plays low effort and thus lower the chance of realizing high values. This is costly since a
JPE scheme promises highest wage if both realize high values. Hence, the repeated interaction
yields both direct and implicit incentives to yield high effort.
Now, for the principal to choose the most efficient wage scheme, he must solve
(3) min n(H,H;O), subject to (2).
1l<!O
This is a relaxed program since there also exists low-effort strategies that constitute subgame
perfect equlibria.
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The following lemma characterizes the solution to (3):
Lemma: Define
8 E [0,8(<1)]. then the RPE scheme ORPE ==(O,f3~:E,O,O)where f3~:E == c
(1- (1)(1- qH )/).q
solves (3).
Proof: See appendix.
The lemma suggests that an extreme form of IPE is optimal for sufficiently high discount
factors, while (under the no collusion assumption) an extreme form of RPE is optimal on
sufficiently low discount factors. Intuitively, there must be a sufficiently high discount factor
if an agent should have interests in assuring future high-effort from his peer, hence JPE is
only optimal on high discount factors.i
It can be shown that O JPE makes the worst sustainable punishment -low effort from both
workers (L,L)- self-enforcing. This makes high effort from both agents (H,H) a subgame
perfect equilibrium (Che and Yoo call this a 'team equilibrium'). Hence, the incentive
constraint given by (2) is sufficient whenf JPEsolves (3). When ORPEsolves (3), (2) is
sufficient ifthe discount factors are sufficiently high (see Che and Yoo for details).
The JPE scheme, O JPE, in contrast to ORPE, has the virtue of being collusion proof since each
agent's work confers positive externalities to their peer, but ORPE is susceptible to collusion
since both agents can jointly be better off by playing low effort. There may, however, exist
institutional constraints to the possibilities of engaging in collusion. Of oourse, there are no
technical constraints to collusion since the agents can observe each other' s actions. But it is
not unrealistic to assume that in an industrious corporate culture it is easier for workers to
5 Not surprisingly then, the RPE scheme is optimal in the static version. In this sense Che and Yoo complements
Holmstrom (1982) and Mookheerjee (1984). The optimality depends on the assumed specification of the
common shock.
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sustain a high effort culture than to initiate a low effort culture. A worker that initiates low
effort collusion may risk great personal costs in loss of prestige and respect from his peers.
Hence, before we proceed to the collusion problem, I will simply assume that there is a social
cost associated with initiating low effort collusion that exceeds the benefits from such
collusion.
2.1 Relational contract between principal and agents
Unlike Che and Y00 I will now assume that the value realizations are not verifiable to a third
party. Hence, the contract between the agents and the principal must therefore be self-
enforcing, and thus 'relational' by definition. I consider a multilateral relational contract,
which implies that any deviation by the principal triggers low effort from both agents. The
principal honours the contract only if both agents honoured the contract in the previous
period. The agents honour the contract only if the principal honoured the contract with both
agents in the previous period. A natural explanation for this multilateral eature is that the
agents interpret a unilateral contact breach (i.e. the principal deviates from the contract with
only one the agents) as evidence that the principal is not trustworthy (see Bewley, 1999).
The contract is self-enforcing if the present va lue of honouring is greater than the present
value of reneging. Ex post realizations of values, the principal can renege on the contract by
refusing to pay the promised wage, while the agents can renege by refusing to accept the
promised wage. In this section I consider a relational employment contract, to use the terms
of BGM. This means that the principal owns the critical assets. Asset ownership conveys
ownership to the values produced, hence, the principal can ex post take the values even if he
is not paying bonus wages.
The parties play trigger strategies. Like BGM, I assume that if one of the parties renege on the
relational employment contract, the other insist on spot employment forever after. Spot
employment implies that the agents exert low effort qL' but receives zero wage (neither bonus
wage nor fixed payment).
The condition for the optimal JPE contract, OJPE, to be self-enforcing is (see appendix)
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(4) 2f3::: ~8-[(l-CT)&JdQ-C],
where dQ = QH - QL' The condition for the optimal RPE contract, BRPE, to be self-enforcing
is (see appendix)
The expression in the square brackets shows the productivity of an agent' s effort. Hence, the
right hand side of (4) and (5) shows the present value of both agents yielding high effort. We
clearly see the difference between the self-enforcing conditions of BJPEand BRPE. While the
principal 'risks' paying both agents in the JPE scheme, he only risks paying one if his agents
in the RPE scheme. Levin (2002) argues that multilateral relational contracts makes relative
performance evaluation favourable, since the principal only has to satisfy the sum of
individual constraints (not every separate incentive constraint) and is thus committed to
reward only one of his agents. But Levin does not allow for implicit contracting between the
agents. In the present model, this possibility can make the necessary ~E wage, f3:::, lower-
powered and thus easier to implement. Hence, there is a trade-off between enforcing a double
set of small JPE wages and a single, but larger RPE wage.
3. Comparative analysis
We can formally compare the self-enforcing conditions of BJPE and BRPE. Solving (4) for o
and inserting for f3::: yields
Solving (5) for o and inserting for f3:::E yields
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(7) 8> 8RPE•- 1+2A(l-qH)
Expression (6) and (7) show the critical discount factors for the optimal JPE contract and the
optimal RPE contract, respectively, to be self-enforcing. If 8 RPE < 8(a) < 8 < 8JPE , then fl JPE
is optimal, but not enforceable, while flRPE is enforceable. The principal must then either
choose a second best JPE contract, or flRPE (a second best JPE contract implies a less extreme
JPE contract where agent i can be paid even if (H,H) is not realized, that is
f3 JPE > f3 JPE and!orLH u f3 JPE > f3 JPE > O (strictHH - HL inequality if f3 JPE = f3 JPE )LH u' where
f3:;E < (l-O")(qH+(;qL )!Jq ). Since a second best JPE contract is more costly than the optimal JPE
contract, fl JPE, this will increase the critical discount factor, s, for when an incentive scheme
that exhibits JPE is chosen. Hence, if ORPE < 8(a) < OJPE, then there exist discount factors
8(a) <o < 8, whereflRPE is chosen.
If o JPE < o < 8(a) < o RPE , then flRPE is optimal, but not enforceable, while fl JPE is
enforceable. The principal must then either choose a second best RPE contract or flJPE (a
second best RPE contract implies a less extreme RPE contract where agent i can be paid even
if (H,L) is not realized, that is f3 f:E < f3:IE and!or f3 ~iE ~ f3 ~E >O(strict inequality if
f3f:E = f3:IE), where f3/Y/ < (l-O"Xl-qH).1q)· Since a second best RPE contract is more costly
than the optimal RPE contract, flRPE , this will decrease the critical discount factor g for when
an incentive scheme that exhib its JPE is chosen. Hence, if o JPE <8(a) < oRPE , then there
exist discount factors 8 <o < 8( a) where flJPE is chosen.
I will now show that increasing levels of productivity increases the enforceability of
flRPE relatively to flJPE. In other words, for sufficiently high levels of productivity,
8RPE < 8JPE• We can rewrite (4) and (S) as
(4')
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(S') __J__<...LA2(l-qH)- I-o '
where A = [ (l-cr)c!J.qtJQ 1] (1- er)&j is a proxy for productivity.
Proposition 1: There is a critical A = A such that 8 'PE = 8RPE , that is
2~qL[-1-AqL+J(1+2AqH+A2q~+4AqL) J= 1+2A(\-qH)· For given levels of qH and qL' if
A> A, then there exist discount factors ORPE::; 0< O'PE where flRPE is a self-enforcing
incentive scheme, and fl JPE is not. JfA < A, then there exist discount factors o JPE ::;o < o RPE
where flJPE is a self-enforcing incentive scheme, and flRPE is not.
Hence, if the productivity of effort increases through an increase in ~Q, and/or a decrease in
er, and/or a decrease in c, we can move from a situation where there exists discount factors
where fl JPEis enforceable and flRPE is not, to a situation where flRPE is enforceable and flJPE is
not. Hence, we obtain an empirical testable hypothesis: when the productivity of effort is high,
RPE is more common. When productivity of effort is low, JPE is more common. The
reasoning goes as follows: the higher the productivity, the easier it is for the principal to offer
credible incentive schemes, hence the critical discount factors decrease. When the critical
discount factors decrease, the necessary RPE wage, f3fi[E is not affected, but the necessary
JPE wage f3::: increases since it is harder for the agents to enforce an implicit contract
between them on low discount factors. Hence, higher productivity makes the enforceability of
RPE rises relatively to JPE. Note that higher productivity does not ræan that JPE is harder to
enforce. High productivity implies however that there is scope for relational contracts even on
low discount factors. But fl JPE is difficult to implement on low discount factors due to the
implicit contract between the agents.
The proposition can be demonstrated graphically:
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The downward-sloping curve corresponds to the left hand side of(4') (hereafter referred to as
the 'JPE curve') and the horizontal curve the left hand side of (5') (hereafter referred to as the
'RPE curve') when qH =0.6 and qL = 0.3. The thick upward-sloping curve corresponds to
the right hand side of (4') and (5') whenA=O.S, while the thin upward-sloping curve,
corresponds to the right hand side of (4') and (5') when A =1. We see that when A = 0.5,
O'PE <ORPE. Now, if productivity increases (A increases), given constant probabilities, the
upward-sloping curve gets steeper and we move to a situation where ORPE < O'PE, as shown
from the thin upward-sloping curve.
Note also that a decrease in qL' grven qH' increases A (the upward sloping curve gets
steeper), while the left hand side of (4') increases so the JPE curve shifts upwards. Hence, a
decrease in qL' given qH' makes the enforceability of fiRPE increase relatively to the
enforceability of fi.JPE . An increase in qH' given qL' also increases A, but now the JPE curve
shifts downwards while the RPE curve shifts upwards. Hence, O 'PE decreases, while O RPE
decreases if A(l- qH) increases. Hence, an increase in qH' given qL' makes the
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enforceability of nRPE increase relatively to the enforceability n/PE , given sufficiently high
levels of dQ , and/or low levels of (J , and/or low levels of c.
If neither n 'PE nor BRPE is enforceable, the principal must either choose a second best lPE or
RPE scheme, or he can chose an incentive scheme based on independent performance
evaluation (IPE). The optimalIPE scheme solves (3) subject to (/3HH' /3LH) = (/3HL' /3LL)' The
agents' incentive constraint is ((J + (1- (J)q H )/3 - c ~ ((J + (1- (J)q L) /3. Solving for /3
yields /3~ ~ = /3::: = /3J:;_E. On low realizations, the principal will pay zero. Hence the
optimalIPE scheme is nIPE == (/3:::, /3::;_E, O, O). The condition for the optimalIPE contract,
nIPE, to be self-enforcing is (see appendix)
(9) 2/3::: s t.r[(1- a)!JtjdQ - c],
which is equivalent to the JPE condition. In IPE, as in JPE, the principal 'risks' paying both
agents. Solving (9) for o and inserting for /3::: = /3J;_E yields
(10) s: >....L _ s: /PEU -I+A -u .
We then haveSIPE <SRPE when qH >t and OIPE <O'PE for sufficiently high productivity.
We can write (9) as
(9') 1s I~lj A
Proposition 2: There IS a critical A = l such that SJPE = SIPE, that IS
21
qL
[-1- lqL+ ~(1+ 2AqH + A2q~ +4AqL) ] = l;A' For given levels of qH and «., if A> l,
and qH > t, then there exist discountfactors OIPE ::;8 <OJPE and OIPE ::;0< ORPE where nIPE is
self-enforcing and n'PE and nRPE are not.
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The proposition shows that the enforceability of JlIPE relative to Jl JPE increases with effort
productivity, for the same reasons as JlRPE to nJPE• Moreover the enforceability ofJlIPE
relative to Jl RPE increases on high probabilities for positive outcome: while the necessary IPE
f3 IPE· . d d f h RPE f3 RPE . . .wage Hj IS In epen ent o q H , t e necessary wage, HL' Increases In qH , given qL •
We can demonstrate proposition 2 graphically:
o 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Figure 2
The parameters are the same as in Figure 1, with A =1. The thick horizontalline represents
the 'IPE curve'(corresponding to the left hand side (9')), while the thin horizontalline is the
'RPE curve'. We see that for qH >tand a sufficiently high A, then8IPE < 8RPE < 8JPE•
So far we have seen that high effort productivity strengthens the self-enforcing conditions of
RPE and IPE schemes relatively to the optimal IPE scheme. The analysis reveals that the
outcomes in Che and Yoo's model are sersitive to the assumption that the parties can write
legally enforceable contracts. Once contracts have to rely on self-enforcement, the optimal
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choice of team incentives becomes more complicated, since the parties can only choose
between self-enforcing incentive contracts. Some numerical examples elucidate this:
Assume that the discount factor is constant over time and has the value o = 0.75
Example 1
Parameters Estimates
c = 1 O/PE = 0.74
(J' = 0.05 ORPE = 0.70
qH = 0.4 OJPE = 0.83
qL = 0.2 8 = 0.66
LlQ = 15
JllPE is optimal but not enforceable, while ORPE is enforceable.
Example 2
Parameters Estimates
c=1 O/PE = 0.74
(J' = 0.2 ORPE = 0.83
qH= 0.7 oJPE = 0.74
qL = 0.4 8 = 0.89
LlQ = 10
ORPE is optimal, but not enforceable, while O.JPE is enforceable.
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Example 3
Parameters Estimates
c = 0.7 8lPE = 0.72
(J = 004 8RPE = 0.81
qH = 0.7 8JPE = 0.77
qL = 0.1 8 = 9.52
~Q =4
ORPE is optimal, but neither OJPE or ORPE is enforceable, while OIPE is enforceable.
4. Collusion
As noted, in contrast to IPE and JPE, RPE is exposed to collusion. If the principal offers
ORPE , then the agents, for 8 close to 1, are better off if they both play low effort (L,L) than if
they both play high effort (H,H). And for any value of8, the agents can playa correlated
randomisation of (L,H) and (H,L) and generate a higher joint payoff than (H,H). Hence, if
there are no institutional constraints to collusion between the agents, then the cost of using
RPE to generate (H,H) raises. It is complicated to analyse the optimal scheme in the region
where the principal 'would have chosen' RPE if it was not for the collusion problem. In order
to prevent collusion, the principal has to offer incentives which make high effort from both
agents (H,H) the only subgame perfect equilibrium. A correlated randomisation strategy
between (H,L) and (L,H) provides the 'hardest' equilibrium to prevent. It can be shown (see
appendix) that the condition that makes this randomisation strategy a non equilibrium is given
by"
(I2) /3 > (2 -8)c = /3RPEC
HL - (1- 0')(2 - 2q H - 8)tJ..q HL'
6 I thank Yeon-Koo Che for help with deducing this expression.
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It will of course be more difficult to enforce RPE schemes if the agents can collude. But the
basic implications from proposition 1 and 2 are not altered. If we compare f3 :JE to f3 ::JEC we
see that the first order effects of (J,!:iq, qH and c is corresponding. Moreover, a decrease in
Ddecreases f3 :JEC ,7 while it increases f3!:tE. Hence, the economics of the observations in the
previous section is robust to the threat of collusion.
Two things are happening to optimality conditions when we allow for collusion. First, since
RPE is now more expensive (that is f3 :JE < f3 :JEC for 8 >O), the region where OJPE is
optimal expands. Second, in contrast to the no collusion case, relative performance evaluation
does not always dominate independent performance evaluation, since the expected cost per
agent in RPE, (1- a)q H (1- qH ) f3 :JEC , exceeds the expected cost per agent in
2a(1-q )
!PE, (a + (1- a)q H f3::;_E, when 8 > 2 (1 )H Q. And since the expected cost per
qH -a +a
agent in IPE is lower than the expected cost per agent in JPE, (a + (1- «»HqH) f3:: when
8 < a(1 - qH) =D , there are levels of discount factors where IPE is optimal.
qL(qH(I-a)+a)
Proposition 3: Jf the agents are able to collude, there exist discount/actors D >8 >Q.. where
independent performance evaluation is optimal.
Observe that the larger qH - qL = cq , the larger is the region (Q,8) where IPE is optimal.
The reason is that JPE is costly when q L is low and RPE is costly when qH is large.
5. Asset ownership
So far I have considered the principal to be the owner of the assets involved. Since the
principal was able to utilize the values that the agents created even after reneging on the
bonus-payment, the assumption was made that the principal owned the critical assets involved
in producing values. This section discusses the self-enforcing conditions of the incentive
7 Observe that when 8 =O, f3 :JE = f3 :JEC. As 8 approaches 2 - 2q H' f3 :JEC approaches infinity. For
8 e (2 - 2qH' 1), RPE can never succeed in preventing the randomization collusion.
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schemes when the agents own critical assets so that they are able to renegotiate the terms of
trade ex post the realization of values. I will argue that independent performance evaluation is
more likely in this situation.
Assume that there are two assets involved in the production, and that each agent uses one
asset to produce values for the principal. Asset ownership conveys ownership of the values
produced. In the previous section it was implicitly assumed that the principal owned both
assets ('principal-ownership '). In this section I assume that the agents own one asset each
('agent-ownership'). This does not necessarily mean that the agents are independent suppliers
owning physical assets. It can also be interpreted as agents in an employment relationship,
where the critical assets are human capital. The main difference from the previous sections is
that the agents are able to renegotiate the terms of trade ex post the realization of values.
In agent-ownership, if the agents deviate from the relational contract by refusing to accept the
promised bonus, they can "hold up" the values they have produced and renegotiate the price.
Assume that there exist an alternative market for the output, and that the price in this market
is either high, PH' or low PL' where QH > QL > PH > PL. The favourable shock, which occurs
with probability a E (0,1), makes both agents produce high values both for the principal and
for the alternative market. I assume one-dimensional effort. This means that the agents cannot
take actions that increase the probability of realizing high- alternative use values PH' without
also increasing the probability of realizing high values for the principal QH. Hence, if the
shock is unfavourable, the probability of realizing PH is q H if the agent's effort is high and
qL if the agent's effort is low. The one dimensional effort constraint ensure that agent i's
wage vector Oi == (13 i HH , 13 iHL, 13 i LH , 13 iLL) still applies since there is then no point in letting
wage depend on the realization of alternative use values Hence, the optimal schemes in
principal-ownership, OJPE, ORPE and OIPE, also applies in agent-ownership. Note that the one-
dimensional effort constraint is most natural in the human capital interpretation of asset
ownership, where the principal can decide the agent's behavioral pattern even though the
agents own the critical assets.
In general, the principal's renegmg temptations are weaker in agent-ownership than m
principal-ownership, since he in agent-ownership cannot just take the goods, but has to
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bargain with the agents if he reneges. I assume that 50:50 Nash bargaining determines the
price, that is Q;:Pj• The agents' reneging temptations are stronger, however, since they can
receive the Nash price if they renege. This 'outside rpportunity' is especially binding with
non- independent performance evaluation since the agents risk getting low wages from the
relational contract, while high realization assure them a high Nash price ifthey renegotiate.
The condition for the optimal lPE contract, OJPE, to be self-enforcing is (see appendix):
When2f3~E > tlQ
(13a) 213:: -ttlQ+M:S; #.r[ (l-a)&JtlQ-c]
When2 13~E < tlQ
(13b) ttlQ+M:S; 1~[(1-a)tlqtlQ-c]
where M= PH - PL' Compared to (13a,b) to (4) slows that it is easier to enforce OJPE in
agent-ownership than in principal-ownership only if M <+tlQ. A disadvantage with the
optimal JPE scheme, OJPE, in agent-ownership is that if only one of the agents realize high
values, he receives no payments and is therefore tempted to renege; that is to renegotiate a
Nash price with the principal. This 'non-independence' problem of agent-ownership becomes
even more severe with the optimal RPE scheme ORPE. The conditions for the RPE contract
ORPE to be self-enforcing is (see appendix):
When 13RPE > .ltlQ
HL 2
When 13RPE <1.tlQ
HL 2
(14b) tlQ+M :S;#.,[(1-a)tlqtlQ-c]
Comparing (14a,b) am to (5) shows that it is more difficult to enforce ORPE in the agent-
ownership than in principal-ownership. Now, if both agents realize high values, they get zero,
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and both have high temptations to renege on the contract since the Nash price is high (due to
the high output-realizations.)
This non-independent problem is eliminated with the OIPE scheme. Since each agent gets paid
according to their own output, independent from their peer's output, they do not risk receiving
no payments within the contract while the Nash price is high. The condition for the IPE
contract O/PE to be self-enforcing is (see appendix):
Comparing (15) to (9) we see that it is easier to enforce OIPE in agent-ownership than in
principal-ownership when ~Q > l:!.P, hence if effort is more productive internally than
externally (effort specificity).
A comparison of the constraints above suggests that the relative enforceability of O/PE toOJPE
and ORPE is strengthened if the agents own the assets. Since IPE, in contrast to JPE and RPE
do not exhibit the 'non-independent problem' we would expect that independent performance
evaluation is relatively more common if agents own the critical assets (or have essential
human capital) so that they are able to renegotiate the terms of trade ex post the realization
of values, than if the principal owns the critical assets.
6. Relevance
There are two important features with the model discussed in the previous section that decides
its applicability. First, the agents can observe each other's actions. Consequently, the model
is best applied on smaller organizations, or on subdivisions of larger organizations. Second,
the relational contract is multilateral, which implies that the agents cooperatively decide
whether or not to honour the contract. Hence, the model is best applied in environments or
corporate cultures where worker-coordination is relatively easy.
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Do we find empirical support for the model' s predictions? A common wage/incentive
structure of hierarchical organizations is that low-wage 'blue collar' workers in the bottom of
a hierarchy enjoy some sort of group incentives, while 'white collar' workers higher up in the
organization typically enjoy incentives based on individual or relative performance (see
Prendergast, 1999 and Appelbaum and Berg, 1999). Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1993),
and Treble, van Gameren, Bridges and Barmby (2001), find that the salary range is much
greater at the higher levels of an organization than at lower levels, which indicates a higher
frequency of individual and relative performance based compensation structure on higher
levels.
The model help explain these observations: Proposition 1 and 2 suggest that RPE or IPE are
more common when the productivity of effort is high, while JPE is more common when
productivity of effort is low. Since wages are expected to reflect the workers' productivity, we
would therefore expect to see higher occurrence of IPE and RPE in higher levels of
organizations where wage and productivity presumably are highest.
The higher frequency of IPE in highly paid jobs can also be explained by the non-
independence problem of RPE and JPE discussed in Section 5. When the workers own the
critical assets, or have essential human capital so that they are able to renegotiate the terms of
trade ex post the realization of values, incentives based on IPE has the advantage that it
balances the value of relational contracting with the value of independent ex post bargaining.
With incentive schemes based on non-independent performance evaluation, there is a greater
probability of getting low payments inside the relation and high payments outside the relation,
which increases the possibility of contract breach. This theoretical result is not surprising. It
helps explain the higher frequency of individual compensation packages and IPE incentives in
human capital- intensive industries.
It is argued that RPE discourages cooperative work morale.f Human recourses managers often
claim that salaries must be compressed to maintain internal harmony in a firm. If the
8 It is also argued that RPE, in addition to discourage cooperative work morale, also encourages employees to
adopt restricted work norms (see Baron and Kreps, 1999). RPE can also distort agents' incentives ifthey carry
out multiple activities (multitasking). Gibbons and Murphy (1990), and more formally Baker (1992) show that
ifworkers can take actions that effect the output oftheir peers, and in addition are able to "game" the
compensation scheme to their benefit, RPE can distort incentives and thus make it less efficient.
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difference between the winner's salary and the loser's salary is too great, morale suffers.
Since the high positions in an organization tend to be dominated by individuals who have
managed to fight the "corporate war", and thus presumably tend to be more aggressive and
more willing to engage in sabotage, one should fmd it necessary to reduce the incentives for
those workers to compete with each other (see for instance Lazear, 1989, 1998); in other
words reduce: the use of relative performance evaluation. But the model in this paper shows
that it is easier to implement incentives based on relative performance evaluation than joint
performance evaluation in high ability/low trust environments (using the discount factor as a
proxy for trust; see Hart 200 l).
7. Conclusion
It can be efficient to reward a group on the basis of the group' s joint performance if the
problem of free riding can be deterred by mutual peer monitoring and social sanctions. But
incentives based on relative performance evaluation and independent performance evaluation
are still quite common even in industries were peer monitoring is possible. Individual
compensation based on IPE and/or RPE is especially common in the higher levels of
organizations. In this paper I have shown how the absence of legally enforceable contracts can
explain this. In a model with self-enforcing relational contracts between principal and agents
it is shown that we can expect a relatively higher frequency of incentive schemes based on
RPE and IPE when the productivity of effort is high. Moreover it is shown that we can expect
to see a relatively higher frequency of IPE schemes if agents own critical assets so that they
can renegotiate the terms of trade ex post realization of values.
This paper has not fully characterized optimal solutions, but showed the important
implications of the relational contract's enforceability constraints when dealing with team
incentives. In formal studies of relational contracts it is important to bear in mind the
subjective natur~ of the discount factor. It is not necessarily optimal for a principal to choose
the optimal incentive scheme among the enforceable ones at a given date. If the discount
factors vary over time, and there are costs associated with shifting from one scheme to
another, it may be optimal to choose the incentive scheme with the lowest critical discount
factor.
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APPENDIX
1. Sketch to proof of Che and Yoo 's Lemma
First we can write out the objective function:
n(H,H,O)=(a + (l-a)qHqH)f3HH
(A.l)
+ (1- a)q H (1- qH )(13 HL+ 13LH) + (1- a )(1 - qH) 2 13LL
As noted, in an RPE scheme, n (L, L; O)> n (L, H; O), so the incentive constraint (2) is
reduced to n(H, H;O) -c ~ n(L,H;O). We can write this out:
(a + (1- a)q HqH)f3 HH+ (l-a)[q H (1- qH )f3HL + (1- qH)q Hf3LH+ (1- qH)(1- q H)f3LL]- C
~ (a + (l-a)qLq H)f3HH+ (l-a)[q L(1-q H)f3HL + (1- qL)qH f3LH+ (1- q L)(I-q H )f3LL]
and simplify it to
The left hand side of the constraint is decreasing in 13u' while the objective function is
increasing in 13u . Hence, it is optimal to set 13u = O, which from n (L, L; O)> tt (L, H; O)
implies that 13LH = O. Since both the objective function and the constraint are linear in O,
only 13HH or 13HLare strictly positive, which fromn(H, L;O) > nt H, H;O) implies 13HH = O.
Hence, the optimal RPE scheme is an the extreme form ORPE== (O,f3~E, O,O)where solving
13 . 13 RPE c(A.2) for HL YIelds HL == ------
(1- a)(I- qH )D.q
In a JPE scheme, n(L,H;O) > n(L,L;O). Thus the incentive constraint (2) becomes
1~6n(H,H;O)- c ~ n(L,H;O) + 1~6n(L,L;O) . We can write this out:
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-& {(a + (1- a)q Hq H ) f3 HH + (1- a)[ q H (1- q H) f3 HL + (1- q H )q H f3 LH + (1- q H )(1- q H) f3 LL ] - c}
;?_ (a + (1- a)q Lq H )f3 HH + (1- a )[q L (1- q H)f3 HL + (1- q L)q H f3 LH + (1- q L )(1- q H )f3 LL]
+ l~O {(a + (1- a)q Lq L)f3 HH + (1- a)[q L (1- q L)f3 HL + (1- q L)q Lf3 LH + (1 - q L )(1- q L) f3 LLn
and simplify it to
The left hand side of the constraint is decreasing in f3 LL' while the objective function is
increasing in f3 LL . Hence, it is optimal to set f3 LL = O. Observe that the coefficient of f3 HL is
weakly greater tam that of f3 LH in the left hand side of (A.3), but that their coefficients are the
same in the objective function (A.l). Suppose f3 LH >O. Then lowering f3 LH and raising
f3 HL simultaneously so that the left hand side of (A.3) remains the same will reduce the value
of the objective function. Hence, it is optimal to set f3 LH = O. Since only f3 HH or f3 HL are
strictly positive f3 HH =Ofrom 7r (H, L;O)< 7r (H ,H; O). Hence, the optimal JPE scheme is an
extreme form OJPE == (f3 HH' O,O,O)where solving (A.3) for yields
f3JPE = C
HH - (1- a)( q H +OqL )!1q
Now, OJPE solves (3) if 7r(H,H,OJPE)<7r(H,H,ORPE). That is
Solving for O yields
For further details see Che and Yoo (2001).
TEAM INCENTIVES IN RELATIONAL CONTRACTS 107
2. The conditions for self-enforcing relational contracts when the principal owns the assets
In JPE, the binding constraint for the principal is when both agents realize high values so that
he has to pay wage /3:::to both agents. The binding constraint for the principal to honour the
contract fl JPE is then given by
where the left hand side shows the expected present value from honouring and the right hand
side shows the expected value from reneging. The square brackets show the principal' s
expected revenue per agent per period.
For the agents, the constraints bind for realization of zero bonus wages. Each agent will thus
simply honour the contract if expected future wage exceeds zero:
Combining (A.4) with (A5) for both agents, tlat is multiplying (A5) with 2 and add with
(A.4) yields:
(4) 2/3:::::;tt( (1-(1)&J~Q-c]
For (4) to be a sufficient condition for the relational contract to hold, either (A.4) or (A5)
must hold with equality. The fixed payment can always be chosen in a waythat either (A.4)
or (A5) holds with equality. From the incentive constraint (2), we see thata must be negative
for (A.5) to hold with equality. Note however; I have not included ex ante participation
constraints in the model. But observe that if the agents have ex ante outside opportunities w,
then the principal must satisfy (A.5') -6-(a + (a +(1- a)qHqH) /3:::-c) ~ w for both agents
to honour the contract, implying that the fixed salary need not be negative for a (A5) to hold
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with equality. As long as low effort is costless, the agents would not have incentives to not
participate if the participation constraint is satisfied. Moreover, the agents cannot use 'no
participation' as a threat in the relational contract ifthe principal then can contract with other
agents at the same cost.
In RPE, the principal only has to pay wage to one of the agents, and this occurs only when
one realizes high values and one realizes low values. The binding constraint for the principal
to honour the contract aRPE is thus
The binding constraint for each agent is
Combining (A6) and (A7) for both agents yields
In IPE, the binding constraint for the principal to honour the contract aIPE is given by
The binding constraint for each agent is
(A9) f3::: +-6-(a+(a+(I-a)qH) f3::: -c)~O
Combining (A8) and (A9) for both agents yields
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(9) 213::: ~&[(1-O")~q~Q-c]
3. The conditions for self-enforcing relational contracts when the agents own the assets.
The principal will honour the contract fl JPE if
where r = QL-+{U+(I-U)qr)åQ;Pr +(u+(l-U)qL }.lP is the expected Nash bargaining price. To see which
realizations bind, we must study (i) 2[3i;PE s ~i + Q; . Observe that (H,L) and (L,H) never bind
since the right hand side of (i) is then higher than (L,L) while both (L,L), (H,L) and (L,H)
yields zero wage. Herce, we must compare (ii) 2[3JPE < QH + QH withHH - 2 2
(iii) 2f3[{E = O ~ Q; + Q; . We see that if the difference between the left hand side of (ii) and
(iii) are smaller than the difference between the right hand side of (ii) and (iii), that is
2[3::: - O <QH - QL , then (L,L) binds since (iii) are then weaker than (ii). Hence, when
2 13~~E> ~Q (A. lO) binds on high realizations of Q, and when 213::: < ~Q , (A.l O) binds on
low realizatiors.
We see that the only difference from (A.4) where the principal has all the ex post bargaining
power, is that the deviation payoff on the right hand side is smaller since he cannot just take
the good, but has to pay for it after deviation. Note also tlat for a relational contract to exist,
the expected Nash bargaining price cannot satisfy the incentive constraint, because then
would either the principal, if it was sufficiently low, or the agents if it was sufficiently high,
insist on spot trading, instead of long term contracts. Hence, if there exists a relational
contract, the agent' s will play low effort after deviation.
110 ESSAY III
The binding constraint for agent i is when he realizes high output as agent j realizes low
output. The optimal JPE scheme, fl JPE, then yields no wage to the agent, while Nash
bargaining yields a higher deviation payoff. Hence, the pair of constraints that bind are
(A.ll) f3£~E+ I~O (a +(a +(1-a)qHqH) f3£~E-c) '? QH;PH + I~O r
(A.12) f3::;_E+l~O(a+(a+(I-a)qHqH) 13:: -c)2:: QL;PH +12or
When2f3::: > ~Q, combining (A.IO) (A.l l) and (A.12) yields
When2f3£~E<~Q, combining (A. lO) (A.l l) and (A.12) yields
In RPE, the principal will honour the contract flRPE if
Observe that (H,H) never binds, since this yields zero wage outlays if he honours, and high
wage outlays '(in terms of Nash prices) if he deviates. Comparing f3~:E::;;Q; + Q{ to
13::E =O::;;~L + ~L shows that when 13::E > f ~Q, then (H,L) binds and when 13::E <+~Q,
then (L,L) binds.
The binding constraint for both agents is
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Observe that the constraint binds when both agents realize high output. The optimal RPE
scheme, nRPE, then yields no wage to the agents, while high realizations yield a higher
deviation payoff.
When /3::E > 1~Q, combining (A.13) and (A.14) then yields
When /3::E s1-~Q, combining (A.13) and (A.14) then yields
(14b) ~Q+M $;8-[(1-(j)~q~Q-cl
In IPE, the principal will honour the contract nIPE if
Each agent will honour the contract if
We see that when 2/3::: > ~Q, (A. IS) binds on high realizations of Q, and (A.16) binds on
low realizations. Combining (A.IS) with (A.16) for both agents
yields2/3::: -~Q+LV'$;~[(1-(j)~q~Q-cl. When 2/3::: <~Q, (A.IS) binds on low
realization of Q, and (A.16) binds on high realizations. Combining (A.IS) with (A.16) for
both agents yi~lds - 2/3::: +~Q + LV' $;~[(1- (j)&J~Q - cl. Using absolutes, we can
reduce it to one condition:
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4. Deducing (12)
For (H,H) to be an equilibrium, f3HLmust be chosen so that the randomisation becomes a non-
equilibrium. This means that the workers must find it profitable to deviate from the
randomisation strategy. Ifthe worker fulfils the strategy, his payoffis
(A.l?) a + f3HL(1-a)qL (l-qH) + 1~81(a+ f3HL(l-a)(qH(I-qL)+ qL (1- qH)) - c)
A worker may only deviate from the randomisation strategy when he gets a tum to play low
effort. The worker can then deviate by playing high effort, and this will be punished in the
future by (H, H)~. Hence the deviation payoffwill be
To make the randomisation a non-equilibrium, f3HL must be chosen so that (A.I8) exceeds
(A.l?). That is
(12) f3HL ~ (2 - 8)c
(1- a)(2 - 2q H - 8)/).q
f3
RPEC
HL
For a sufficiently high S , (12) becomes negative; and there exists no f3HL that will induce
(A.l8) to exceed (A.l?). In that case, RPE can never succeed in preventing the randomisation
collusion. But for sufficiently low discount factors there exist critical b values for the
randomisation strategy to be non-equilibrium.
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Norms Matter
Ola Kvaløy'
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Abstract: Even though norms have been integrated in the formal theory of the firm, we have
not seen a clear-cut relationship between norms and firm boundaries. This paper shows how
norms actually can determine firm boundaries. In a repeated trust -game with symmetric
information and endogenous verifiability of actions, I show why non-integration is expected
to dominate in low-trust environments. In a static trust-game with asymmetric information
and tit-for-tat types, I show why assets should be allocated to those with the best reputation of
being trustworthy.
• I thank Frøystein Gjesdal, Petter Osmundsen and especially Trond E. Olsen for valuable comments and
suggesti ons.
120 ESSAY IV
1. Introduction
The role of norms has become an important issue in the formal theory of the firm. Norms such
as trust and trustworthiness help explain transactions both between and within firms. A norm
can be defmed as " ... a rule that is neither promulgated by an official source, such as a court or
legislator, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions, )et it is regularly complied with ... "
(Posner, 1997). This in contrast to a law, which is a rule that is enforced legally. Even though
norms cannot be legally enforced, rational agents obey norms if obedience confers private
benefits, and reciprocally behaving agents obey norms if others obey them.
Some rules must rest upon both law and norms to be enforced. Rules formulated in a contract
are the most obvious. There are certain features of a contract that can be legally enforced, but
most contracts are incomp lete in the sense that there are elements that cannot be verified, and
there are contingencies that cannot be foreseen. Still, contracts are adhered to, even when the
possibility of legal enforcement is small. Contracts are in these instances enforced by mrms
of trust and trustworthiness.
There are two main approaches to formalize trust. The most commonly used is based on the
framework of infmitely repeated games. If agents transact repeatedly, they will honour trust to
ensure future cooperative transactions. This approach makes trust a feasible option for
rational agents. Honouring trust is a way to invest in a valuable reputation. A second approach
is based on asymmetric information and reciprocity. If agents regard it as a possibility that
other agents act reciprocally, trust and cooperation can be attained in a one shot transaction. 1
Formalization of trust has added a great deal to our understanding of relational contracts,
dynamic incentives and so forth, but as Hart (2001) demonstrates, it is hard to fmd clear-cut
relationship between trust and optimal allocation of asset ownership. In the repeated game
approach, where the discount factor is a proxy for trust, a move from a "low-trust"
l On reciprocity, see Fehrand Gachter (2000) for an overview. On trust in finitely repeated games with
asymmetric information, see Kreps et. al, (1982).
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environment to a "high-trust" environment only reveals that cooperation in general is more
likely to occur both between integrated parties and non-integrated parties.i
In this paper I will show that the level of trust and the trust-structure in a relationship can
determine optimal asset allocation. In Section 2 I take a repeated game approach, analysing a
game between a buyer and a seller of inputs. I do not make the standard assumption that
contract verifiability is exogenously given; instead I introduce endogenous probability of
contract verification. 3 The more tre parties invest in contract specifications, the higher is the
probability of a third party (the court) verifying and thus legally enforcing the contract. If the
discount factor is sufficiently low, transactions will only be implemented if the possibility for
contract verification is sufficiently high. By introducing endogenous probability of legal
contract enforcement, we get hold of a trade-off between 'direct transactions costs', first
discussed by Coase (1937), and "strategic transaction costs", introduced by Klein, Crawford
and Alchain (1978), Williamson (e.g. 1979, 1985), Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and
Moore (1990): the lower the degree of relationship-specific under investment, the higher is
the necessary investment in contract specification.
This substitutability between direct and strategic transaction costs makes it possible to study
optimal asset allocation focusing on institutional differences in possibilities of legal contract
enforcement. Rock and Wachter (2001) argue that the incentives to invest in a detailed
contract are weaker when parties are under the same ownership than when parties are under
separate ownership. The governance systems meant to protect the integrity of a transaction are
very different within firms than between firms. Within firms the residual claimant decides the
outcome of any contract breach. Two subdivisions of a firm will be hesitant to write a strict
formal contract since the power to ensure the implementation of it is weak. Corporate law
gives shareholders within certain limits the right to exercise this power, and legal courts are
not intended to intervene in intra- firm disputes. Transactions between firms, however, are
2 For instance, in dynamic versions of property rights models (see Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002; Halonen,
2002) there are not clear-cut relationships between discount factors and optimal allocation of assets. (The
rroperty rights theory was developed by Grossman and Hart, 1986; and Hart and Moore, 1990).
So called Costly State Verification Models (CSV) have focused on contract design problems where verification
is an issue. But the CSV approach considers verification of exogenous state variables, not endogenous effort
variables as here. See Krasa and Villamil (2000) for a generalization of the CSV models. Ishiguro (2002)
analysis endogenous verifiability of endogenous effort variables in a static principal agent model, but do not
consider the effect of endogenous verifiability in self-enforced relational contracts, as in this paper. Kvaløy
(2003) develops this point.
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technically protected by legal courts. The problem is, of course, that it is hard to verify
complex contracts. But parties who enjoy separate ownership are nevertheless more interested
in specifying a detailed contract, since judges enforce contracts according to their terms, while
shareholders exercise power in order to maximize shareholder value. Hence, the marginal
effect of increased contract specifications on the probability of verifying and thus legally
enforcing a contract is thought to be stronger between than within firms. In repeated
relationships with contracts relying both on legal eiforcement and self-enforcement, this
institutional difference in possibilities for legal contract enforcement implies that non-
integration dominates in low trust environments: if the discount factor is sufficiently low, the
contract cost necessary to impernent a contract is higher when the parties are integrated, than
when the parties are non- integrated
In Section 3 I analyse the static version of the same game, but now with non-verifiable
actions, reciprocal agents and asymmetric information. I show that if a trust game is played
only once, the party with the best reputation of being trustworthy should own the asset. As
residual claimant, the asset owner has the power to either honour or abuse trust, when
contracts cannot be verified. If the asset owner is considered trustworthy, it relaxes the
trusting party's participation constraint, and increases the surplus from the transaction. It is a
well-known insight from the theory of reputations (see Kreps 1990, Tadelis, 1999, 2002) that
if an agent gains a reputation of acting trustworthy and fair, it will be easier for other agents to
transact with him. But this theory assumes rational agents and focuses on how reputation
concerns can provide incentives for short-lived agents, and thus how a good reputation can
become a tradable asset. The novelty in this paper is to demonstrate a clear-cut relationship
between reputation and optimal asset allocation. Experimental evidence suggests that a good
reputation increases the level of relationship specific investments even in one-shot
transactions. Employers make generous job offers if they expect workers to behave in a
reciprocal manner. Similarly, workers supply high effort if they expect employers to respond
reciprocally (see Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiger, 1997). By applying the concept of sequential
reciprocal equilibrium (SRE), developed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2003), I show that
if reciprocal (tit-for-tat) behaviour is the norm, then the parties' reputation of obeying this
norm is decisive for optimal asset allocation, since the asset owner' s reputation decides the
surplus from the transaction.
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2. Non-integration dominates in low-trust environments
Consider two managers, M I and M2, where M2 uses an asset to produce a good that can be
used in Ml 's production process. Ml pays M2 a salary S, in return M2 delivers a quality q.
Payoffto Ml is Y(q) - S where Y(q) is the good's value added, and Y'(q) > O,Y"(q)::; O .
Payoff to M2 is S - C(q) where C(q) is the cost of producing quality q, and
C'(q) > O,C"(q) > O. Total surplus from the transaction is then TI(q) = Y(q) - C(q).
Ml and M2 agree upon a compensation S' and a quality «'. We can think of this
relationship as a trust game:
Ml
Ml 's payoff:
M2' s payoff:
Y(q*)-S*
S* -C(q*)
_So
S*
Y(q*)
-C(q*)
O
O
Figure 1
Ml pays M2 a salary S* ex ante, trusting that M2 will deliver on tre agreed upon quality q *.4
M2 can honour that trust by delivering q * , or he can abuse trust by not delivering a value
adding quality, that is q = O.5 Assume first that the contract specifying the content of q * is
non-verifiable. Played only once, the Nash equilibrium is [S = O,q = O], hence no transaction
takes place. If the game is played repeatedly, and the discount factor is sufficiently high, then
4 The trust structure in figure l is not unrealistic. Consider for instance a researcher doing a research report for an
external company. It is not unusual that the researcher gets paid for the number of working hours reported. First
when the researcher has got his payment, he delivers his report. Due to imperfect monitoring, the researcher can
easily misinform number ofhours worked, and the buyer risk paying for an invaluable report.
5 Trust-abuse is equivalent to any q * s', but ifM2 is to abuse trust we might as well model this as ifhe is able
to playq=O
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trigger strategies constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where ls = S" ,q = q' J IS
played in every stage game.
In the repeated game, M2 will honour trust as long as "to-(S - C(q» ~ S where O is the
discount factor. That is
(1) where Y(q) ~ S ~ C(q).
If (1) holds, then transactions will take place, since M2 has incentives to honour trust, and Ml
can anticipate this. Assume that Ml has the bargaining power to decide S. Ml then solves
Ma.x[Y(q)-S], subject to (1),
q,S
which yields the first order condition Y' (q ) = C~q) • Observe that first-best quality level, q FR , is
not achievable for discount factors lower than one. Due to the convex cost function, the
parties will underinvest in quality, that is q < qFR when 0< 1. We see that the lower the
discount factor the lower the quality level. In other words: quality is a negative function of
trust level.
Assume now that the parties to a certain extent can rely on a third party (the court) to verify q.
Let k denote the level of contract costs, where k includes the cost of all activities,
excluding C(q), necessary to implement the transaction. Let v(k) denote the probability that
the true content of q' will be verified in a court of law in case of contract breach, where
v(O) = O, v'(k) > O, and v"(k) < O. Verification implies legal enforcement. Ifthe parties can
write verifiable contracts specifying large penalties in case of contract breach, first-best is
easily implemented. It is reasonable to assume, however, that contracted penalties are denied
by the court if they are sufficiently large relative to the actual loss from contract breach. I
follow Ishiguro (2002) in assuming that if a contract breach is verified, then the court applies
expected damages as a breach remedy, so that the victim of a breach is as well off as if the
contract were fully performed. Hence, verification implies that M2 is legally forced to deliver
q* to the cost of Ciq"),
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M2 will now honour trust if '2;r(S - C(q)) ;:::S - v(k)C(q). Hence, transactions take place if
(2) 8 > C(qXI-v(k»- S-v(k)C(q) •
Ml now solves
(3) Max[ Y(q) - S - k] subject to (2).
q,k,S
This yields the first order conditions
(4) Y'(q)= C~q)(I-(1-8)v(k))
(5) C~q)(1-8)v'(k)~I, k et),
where (S) holds with complementary slackness. We observe that q < qFB when vek) < 1 and
8 < 1. Observe that for vek) > O and v'(k) sufficiently high (in particular v'(O) sufficiently
high), Ml will choose k > O so that the quality level can be increased relatively to the
situation where vek) = O, \Ik. The first order conditions elucidate a classic relationship
between trust and transaction costs. Reduced trust level (reduced discount factor), reduces
quality, ceteris paribus, but this can be compensated by increased investments in contract
specifications, And correspondingly, the more costly it gets to write verifiable contracts
(lowerv'(k), \Ik), the lower the quality level, ceteris paribus, but this can be compensated if
the parties are able to move to a higher trust-environment.
Interestingly, comparative static shows that the chosen quality level that the parties choose is
not necessarily a positive function of the relationship's trust-level. If v'(k)is not too large,
however, the most intuitive result always holds: The higher trust level, the higher quality
level, hence the less severe is the problem of relationship specific under investment, that is
~ > O. But the analysis indicates that high levels of 8 together with high levels of v'(k) may
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yield *" <O (see appendix). In this situation, higher trust level reduces quality and thus
increases the problem of relationship specific under investments. Hence, a high trust level can
prevent the agents from making profitable investments in a detailed verifiable contract, since
they rather rely on relational contracting. The result is an nteresting complement to Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy (1994). They show that the presence of explicit (verifiable) contracts
can make relational contracts infeasible. The model in this paper indicates that the feasibility
of proper relational contracts can lead to an inefficient level of explicit detailed contracting.
We see that the model reveals a simple trade-off between quality investment and contract
costs. The higher specified quality level, the higher is the contract costs necessary to enforce
the trarsaction. We could say that the direct contract costs, k, corresponds to Coase's concept
of transactions costs, while the efficiency-loss of not being able to implement first-best,
TI(qFE) - TI(q*), corresponds to the strategic transaction costs discussed in different forms by
Williamson et. al. Coase discusses the cost of discovering relevant prices, and the costs of
"negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction ... ," but are
virtually silent about strategic transaction costs. Williamson et. al. discuss problems of
opportunism and under investment, but say little about direct costs of contracting. By
introducing endogenous probability of legal contract enforcement, we get hold of a trade-off
between direct transactions costs and strategic transactions costs:
Proposition 1: Direct 'Coasian' transactions costs, k; and strategic 'Williamsonian'
transactions costs, TI(qFE) - TI(q' ), are substitutes.
In principle, (3) can be solved for exact values of q and k . But in a competitive market, it is
reasonable to believe that there exists a minimum necessary quality level. Assume now that
Ml sells Y in a market that requires q ;::::q . Moreover, assume that q exceeds the quality level
that solves (3). Ml must then solve (3) for q = q , that is
[ - k] bi 5: C(q)(l-v(k))Max Y(q)-S - ,su ject tou ;::::S-v(k)C(ij) ,rs
which yields
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(6) C~q)(1-8)v'(k):S;I, k~O.
We can then discuss the optimal contract cost, k, given quality level, 'li. If C~q)(1-8)v'(k) < I
then k = O. This occurs if v'(O) is sufficiently low, or the discount factor is sufficiently high.
But if C~q)(1- 8)v'(k) = I then Ml have incenives to invest k > O in specifying the content
of 'li.
Consider now two types of ownership structure: a) Integration: Ml and M2 are agents at the
same firm. A third party - the owner of the firm - has residual control right over physical
assets, and is therefore supposed to solve any transactional disagreements between the agents.
b) Non-integration: M2 is a supplier outside the control of the firm owning Ml. In case of
disagreements, the parties must rely on the court as a neutral third-party. As argued, it is
reasonable to believe that the marginal effect of investment in contract specifications on the
probability of verifying and legally enforcing the contract is greater when Ml and M2 enjoy
separate ownership, than if M2 and Ml are agents at the same firrn. That is
vNI '( k) > Vl' (k) where subscript NI denotes non- integration and I denotes integration. Note
that it need not be more complicated to specify the content of q in integrated solutions than in
non- integrated solutions. But since the owner of the integrated company is prone to interfere
in disputes between Ml and M2, the marginal effect of contract specifications on the
probability of legal enforcement is reduced by the probability that the owner instead of the
court will solve contractual disputes.
In order to insulate the effect of differences in verifiability, I consider the case where
bargaining positions are independent from organizational form." Then, from (6) we have
Proposition 2: Assume vm '(k) > VI '(k) . Let k, .i = NI,! denote the optimal contract cost,
givenqualitylevel 'li.lfC~q)(1-8)vi'(k)=1 ,i=NI,! then kl >kNJ >0.
6 Recall that bargaining power does not necessarily follow residual control rights. Even if M I do not have
residual control rights in any of the organizational forms discussed above, he can still have the bargaining power
to decide level of S, for instance if he is a monopsonist.
128 ESSAYIV
Proposition 2 says that if the discount factor is sufficiently low, so that c, > O, then the
contract cost is higher when the parties are integrated, than when the parties are non-
integrated
Moreover, we know that if Y(q) < C~q),then k > O. But if contract investments are not
sufficiently profitable (v'(k) too low), than the parties will rather cancel the whole transaction
than invest in contract specifications. Hence, we obtain
Proposition 3: If Y(q')<ci), C~q)(1-8)vI'(O)<I, and C~q)(1-8)vNI'(O)=I, then
transactions will only take place under non-integration
Proposition 2 and 3 suggest that non-integration dominates in low-trust environments. If the
discount factor is sufficiently low, the firm have incentives to outsource agents either because
it is the only way to make transactions feasible, or because it reduces the transaction costs.
This result is deduced from an economic environment where both legal enforcement
capabilities and the level of trust matters. It demonstrates the importance of understanding the
contract enforcement mechanisms 7 of various governance structures in order to determine
optimal asset allocation.
3. The party with the best reputation should own the asset
Consider the same trust- game as in the previous section. Assume no third party owner, so that
either Ml or M2 owns the asset. Assume that ownership of the asset conveys ownership of
the good produced." Moreover, assume here that the asset owner has the bargaining power to
decide S. IfMI owns the asset, then M2 has the first move, allowing Ml to refuse paying the
compensation S* ex post the production ofq*. If M2 owns the asset, Ml has the first move,
allowing M2 to receive S* without producing q'. The set up in figure I is thus one in which
M2 owns the asset. Let us now assume reciprocal agents: the parties play tit for tat strategies,
so that if the first mover trusts the asset owner, trust is honoured. Assume asymmetric
7 See Torsvik (2000) for a discussion on the importance of contract enforcement mechanisms.
8 This is not uncommon in the literature. See e.g. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002).
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information in the sense that the party not owning the asset cannot be certain whether the
asset-owner is a tit-for-tat type. If Ml is the asset owner, M2 sees a possibility PI that Ml
plays tit for tat. If M2 is the asset owner, Ml sees a possibility P2 that M2 plays tit for tat.
Hence, Mi will as a first mover maximizes his profit given his beliefs about :!\t, while as a
second mover honour trust if he is trusted. These strategies corstitute a sequential reciprocal
equilibrium (SRE) as defmed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2003).9
Assume that PI and Pi are known to both parties. We can interpret these parameters as the
parties' reputation for being trustworthy. A cooperative tit-for-tat strategy is considered to
represent a fair, reciprocal behaviour. The greater P, the better is the reputation of fairness. To
keep it simple, I here abstract from any possibility of verifying the contract, that is
v(k)= O, Vk.
Let us first look at the case where M2 owns the asset. Ml will now enter the relationship if
P2(Y(q) -S) + (1- pz)(-S) ~ O. That is
(7) Y(q) ~..LS.
P2
One may now consider (7) as a constraint in M2' s maximization problem:
Max[S - CCq)] subject to (7).
q,S
This yields the fIrst order condition
(8) Y' (q) = .£:ill.
P2
We see that P2 < I leads to under investment in quality: the participation constraint of Ml
(given by (7)) makes it impossible to implement q = qFB. The parties will thus agree upon a
9 An SRE is a strategy profile such that at a given stage, each player makes choices that maximize his utility
given his beliefs, and given that he follows his initial strategy, where his initial strategy is determined by his
sensitivity towards reciprocity. In this paper the players are fully sensitive towards reciprocity, implying that if
Mi trusts Mj, Mjhonours trust always,
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quality level q < q FR o lo Compared to first-best we see that this efficiency loss is greater the
lower P2 o If M2 has a bad reputation, it would be impossible for Ml to enter the relationship
unless the size of the transaction (the levels of q and S) is modest.
Let us now turn to the case where Ml owns the asset. The trust game is then given in figure 2:
M2
.r>: 'r>:
M2' s payoff: S* -C(q*) - C(q)' S* O
Ml 's payoff: Y(q*) _So Y(q)' _So O
Figure 2
Now M2 enters the relationship if Pt(S -C(q)) +(1-Pt )(-C(q));;:::O o That is
(9)
Ml now solves
Max[Y(q)- S] subject to (9),
q,S
which yields
(10) Y'(q) = sui
P,
to Under investment is due to the assumptions ofa convex cost function and a non-convex product function.
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Now, PI < 1 leads to under investment in quality: the quality level must be reduced relative to
first-best in order to make M2 enter tre relationship.
Optimal asset allocation is now straightforward. Since social surplus from the transaction is
given by Il = Y(q' (p;)) - Ctq' (p i)), (i = 1,2)where:- >O, we obtain:
Proposition 4: If PI > P2' then it is optimal to let Ml own the asset. If PI < P2' then it is
optimal to let M2 own the asset.
Proposition 4 suggests that the party with the best reputation of being trustworthy should own
the asset. A difficulty with this approach is, of course, that it is hard to measure Pi' and that
the players cannot easily communicate these estimations. On the other hand, Pi is likely to be
a function of Mi's dependence of a good reputation. For instance, the players can
operationalize Pi on the basis of the parties' number of alternative trading partners.
4. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to show that norms should playa role in models of optimal
asset allocation. In both the repeated game approach, and the reciprocal asymmetric
information approach, norms matter. In the repeated game approach, it is shown that non-
integration is expected to dominate in low trust environments. In the asymmetric information
approach, it is shown that the party with the best reputation of being trustworthy should own
the asset.
The repeated game approach in Section 2 shows a trade-off between direct transaction costs
and strategic transaction costs. For a given level of quality on the transacted good, the
efficient asset allocation is a way to reduce the direct cost of contracting that quality
(transaction costs in Coases' sense). The asymmetric information approach in Section 3
abstract from direct transaction costs. There, asset allocation is a way to reduce the degree of
relationship specific under investment (strategic transaction costs in Williamson et. al' s
sense). An issue to examine further is how norms affect the dominance of direct transaction
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costs versus strategic transaction costs. For instances; do inefficiencies from Coasian
transaction costs dominate in low-trust environments with rational agents, while the problem
of inefficient relationship-specific investments dominates in reciprocal corporate cultures with
asymmetric information?
APPENDIX
Determining the sign of 1t :
When (2) binds, we can insert for Sin (3) and express the problem in the following form:
MaxH(q,k,8) = Y(q) -C(q) I-(l-~)v(k) k
q,k
The first order conditions (4) and (5) can then be written
Hq(q,k,8)=0
Hk(q,k,8)=0
where subscript denotes partial derivatives.
To fmd maximum, the second order (concavity) conditions must be satisfied (for simplicity I
exclude functional arguments):
Hqq < O
n; <O
H qq H kk - (H qk ) 2 > O
By differentiating the first order conditions with respect to 8 ,we obtain the equation system
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From Cramer's rule we can now solve for~:
(A.l)
Wehave
H
qq
=Y"(q)-C"(q) l-(l-~)V(k) < O
H AA = C(q) (I-O~V'(k) < O
H
qk
= C'(q) (l-O~v'(k) > O
H = C'(q)l-l(k) >0qo -r
H = C(q) l-v'(k)
ko 02
For the second order conditions to be fulfilled, the denominator in (A.l) must be positive.
Hence for ~ > O, we must have - HqOH AA + HkOH qk >O. For v'(k) < l, which
implies Hko > O, this is always true.
From the first order conlition (S) we have
v'(k) =bdq)
We see that in optimum v'(k) > I for higher levels of 8. Hence, for high levels of 8 and
v'(k), the numerator in (A.l) may turn negative, which implies, given that the second order
conditions are satisfied, that ~ < O.
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